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SOCIAL CONTRACTNEURALIIY
I. INTRODUCTION
"Neutrality" has become the slogan that the Supreme Court uses for
judging all claims of freedom of religion whether under the Establishment
Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.1 However, the word "neutrality" conceals
the Court's inconsistent use of the concept. Thus, in Rosenberger v. Rectors of
the University of Virginia,2 the recent debate about funding for religious
publications, both the majority and the dissent asserted that only their approach
was truly neutral. 3
This inconsistency in the meaning of neutrality in the religion clauses is
merely part of a general inconsistency in the Court's treatment of the religion
clauses. Some of these conflicts are between the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. The Court's Establishment Clause cases evince a concept of
neutrality that prohibits laws with non-neutral effects, 4 while the Court's Free
Exercise Clause cases allow non-neutral effects. 5 Taxpayers may challenge the
use of the government's money to support religion6; however, they may not
challenge the government's donation of a 77-acre tract of land and buildings to
the Valley Forge Christian College.7 The Court even says that the Free
I The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ." U.S. CoNST.
amend. I. For cases expressly applying a neutrality analysis, compare, e.g., Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (Establishment Clause) with Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-42 (1993) (Free
Exercise Clause) and Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (Free Exercise
Clause).
2 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
3 See Id. at 2522 ("The governmental program here is neutral toward religion."); id. at
2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing neutrality of program and stating, "Not to
finance Wide Awake, according to petitioners, violates the principle of neutrality by sending
a message of hostility toward religion. To finance Wide Awake, argues the University,
violates the prohibition on direct state funding of religious activities."); id. at 2528
(Thomas, J., concurring) (describing "long tradition of allowing religious adherents to
participate on equal terms in neutral government programs"); id. at 2541 (Souter, I.,
dissenting) ("[T]he issue [is] whether a law is truly neutral with respect to religion (that is,
whether the law either 'advance[s] [or] inhibits religion.'")) (quoting Allegheny County v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989)).
4 See, e.g., Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710.
5 See Lukuni Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
6 See Elast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
7 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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Exercise Clause itself conflicts with the Establishment Clause.8
These inconsistencies are not confined to differences between establishment
and free exercise. There are also inconsistencies between those clauses and
closely related constitutional provisions. The Court's intent-based test under the
Free Exercise Clause allows exemptions; 9 the Equal Protection cases on which
the Court's Employment Division v. Smith opinion relied for the intent test do
not. 10 The Court relies on Jefferson's and Madison's support for freedom of
religion in free speech cases.I 1 The author of the most recent of these opinions
has argued that Jefferson's and Madison's support for freedom of religion is
irrelevant in freedom of religion cases. 12 Coercion is not an element of a free
speech case; 13 coersion is an element of a free exercise case. 14
These inconsistencies demonstrate not only the ambiguity of the word
"neutrality," 15 but also the lack of any agreement on the appropriate techniques
for interpreting the word. This Article seeks to supply the omission by arguing
that the Court should interpret the idea of "neutrality" in the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses according to the Framers' and ratifiers' understanding of
the federal Constitution as a social contract.16 According to this social contract
8 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
9 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(adopting an intent-based test for the Equal Protection Clause)).
10 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); id. at 520
(Scalia, I., concurring).
11 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 & n.31 (1977); Keller v.
State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 10 (1990).12 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 & n.11 (1976) (allowing New York Civil
Liberties Union and other public interest groups standing to challenge governmental
expenditures under the Free Speech Clause).
14 "'[lit is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion.'" Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 223 (1963)).
15 "Neutrality can be defined in quite different ways," and "the term neutrality is
unfortunate; [because] some of its connotations are highly misleading, others suggest
altogether impractical principles." JoHN RAWLS, PoLmrIcAL LIBERALISM 191 (1993)
[hereinafter RAWLS, PoLrrIcAL LIBERALISM]. Cf. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208
(1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEoRY OF JUSTICE] ("It may be said against the principle of
equal liberty that religious sects, say, cannot acknowledge any principle at all for limiting
their claims on one another.").
16 Numerous authors have reviewed the religious beliefs of the Framers for insight into
how they would have liked the Constitution to affect the government's ability to aid or
interfere with religion. However, no one has examined the overall contractarian approach
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theory, the government was created to protect pre-existing rights and acquired
its powers by succeeding to some of the rights of the people that formed it.17
This view has two important consequences. First, the government cannot
favor or disfavor individuals on the basis of religion. This is because
individuals' possession of religious views in the state preceding the formation
of the government did not create rights against one another. Because the
government succeeded to the rights of the individuals, the government likewise
did not have rights against individuals. This prohibits government
discrimination and favoritism. It also prohibits the use of government resources
to promote religion, because promotion would allow the government to take the
money from some citizens to support the views of others, something that no
one could have done before the formation of government.
Second, the government cannot prohibit conduct that does not affect others.
This is because only conduct that affects others interferes with someone's
rights. Thus, the burning of ceremonial candles and the consumption of
sacramental wine or peyote were protected from state intervention. Moreover,
the Framers did not believe that a person's rejecting or ignoring the religious
views of others invaded their rights. Thus, blasphemy, heresy, and the like
were utterly beyond state regulation.
In the Framers' view, this achieved complete protection of religious rights.
The government could not discriminate in favor of or against individuals on the
basis of their religious views. And, because the Framers believed that true
religion did not invade the rights of others, the ban on government regulation
of conduct that did not affect others provided full protection for religious
practice.
Interpreting the religion clauses according to the Framers' view has many
advantages. It eliminates the conflict between the clauses: the Framers believed
using governmental powers to support religious claims would illegitimately use
the government to provide favors to the politically powerful that they could not
have obtained before the formation of the government. It explains why
religious rights were "inalienable": the Framers believed they had written a
for its implications for religious liberty. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CoNSTIrurIoNAL LAW §§ 14-3 to -5 (2d ed. 1988); Ashby D. Doyle II, Fear and Trembling
at the Court: Dimensions of Understandi'ng in the Supreme Court's Religion Jurisprudence,
3 SETON HALL CoNsT. L.J 55, 83-91 (1993) (discussing views of Anne Hutchinson, Roger
Williams, James Madison, and the effect of the Great Awakening); Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exmption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEo. WAsH. L.
REV. 915 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting
Paradigms of Religious Freedom. Liberty v. Equality, 1993 BYU L. REV. 7.
17 See infra note 32.
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Constitution that would fully protect all legitimate religious claims. It explains
why religious rights were thought to be implicit in the original Constitution: the
Framers believed that the limitation on the purpose of government meant that
the government could neither discriminate on the basis of religion nor prohibit
conduct that did not affect others.
I. THE SocIAL CONTRACT VEW OF GOVERNMENT
A theory of neutrality requires a definition of the "neutral" point from
which deviations are prohibited.18 The common understanding of the Framers,
ratifiers, and the public at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights was that these documents embodied a social contract theory of
government. 19 Under such a theory, the purpose of the government was not to
create rights, but rather to enforce pre-existing rights. That implies two
components to neutrality. First, because no one in the pre-existing society
could make or defend a claim against others on religion, whether the religion of
the claimant or the religion of the person against whom the claim was made,
the government could not do so either. Second, the government could not
interfere with private conduct unless that conduct affected others. This was so
even if the interference was not based on religion.
The social contract view has two consequences. First, limiting the
government's power to intervene in cases where one individual threatens
another's rights safeguards individual liberties. Second, prohibiting individuals
from making claims on government resources prevents the government from
promoting religion.
Some may argue that the social contract view is irrelevant to interpreting
the Constitution.20 To address the issue, I will show that at the time of the
framing, the social contract view was used to advance claims of religious
liberty and was ubiquitous in social discourse and constitution making.
Alternative sources, such as the debates and post amendment practice, are
18 See RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE, supra note 15, at 260-63.
19 See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
4 [hereinafter Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance], in 2 JAMES MADISON, WRrrNGs OF
JAMES MADISON, 1783-1787 183-91 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
20 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1525 (1995)
(Thomas, I., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)) ("When
the Framers did not discuss the precise question at issue, we have turned to 'what history
reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of [the Establishment Clause's]
guarantees.'"). By giving priority to the Framers' discussion, Justice Thomas's approach
reverses the priority argued for here.
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incomplete, contradictory, or have little relationship to the contemporary
understanding of the religion clauses.
A. Using the Framers' Social Contract Theories to Understand the
Constitution
1. The Ubiquity of the Social Contract Perspective
Social contract theory provided the background against which the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted. 21 The colonists used this
vision of society to justify claims of religious freedom at the time of the
movement for independence. 22 This social contract theory defined their
understanding of neutrality. The debates over the state and federal constitutions
"were direct continuations of the discussions that had preceded
Independence,"2 and the same social contract principles were used to justify
claims of rights in these debates. 24
Because of this social contract theory, the Framers and the public at the
time of the revolution and framing conceived governments as resulting from an
agreement among people to provide a means for enforcing existing rights. In
the words of the most famous of these statements, the Declaration of
Independence, "Governments are instituted among Men," not to create new
rights, but "to secure rights" already existing.25 Through these agreements
21 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUrION 164-66
(1991).
2 2 See generally BERNARD BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMEmCAN
REVOLUTION 246-72 (1967).
2 Id. at 231; see also VA. CONST. art. I; OscAR HANDLIN, THE AMERCANS 164
(1963).
2 4 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison,
June 8, 1789) [hereinafter 1 ANNALS] (distinguishing between natural rights, inherent in the
very nature of the compact, and positive rights, resulting from the terms of the agreement,
and considering rights to freedom of religion and expression as natural rights). For
example, the Federalist Papers repeatedly restricted governmental power where it was
"contrary to the first principles of the social compact." THE FEDERALisT No. 44, at 282
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and
laws impairing the obligation of contracts); see also id. No. 43, at 279 (James Madison)
(referring to principles of the compact); id. No. 51, at 323-25 (James Madison). See
generally DAVID AJ. RiCHARDS, FOUNDATIONS Op AMERICAN CONSTrrtrnONALiSM (1989)
(arguing that the Framers were contractarians).
25 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also, e.g., Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 19, at 4; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
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creating governments, individuals surrendered their power to enforce their
rights themselves, but retained other rights that were thought to be
inalienable. 26
The social contract theory and the language of inalienable rights were used
to justify objections to religious exactions. In the most famous of these debates,
over the Virginia Assessment Bill from 1784 to 1785, Madison wrote his
widely circulated Memorial and Remonstrance.27 The Memorial argued, "If
'all men are by nature equally free and independent,' all men are to be
considered as entering into Society... as relinquishing no more, and
therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rightS." 28
"[E]very man who becomes a member of any particular civil Society, [must]
do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign." 29 "[1f
religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be
subject to that of the Legislative Body. "30
This social contract view was reflected in The Federalist Papers, written to
advocate the adoption of the federal Constitution.31 The same social contract
language was echoed in many of the state constitutions extant at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. Typically, these constitutions described the
religious rights as inalienable, and therefore incapable of being surrendered. 32
1, 64 (1947) (appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
719 (1970) (appendix II to Justice Douglas's dissent); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE
OF GOvERNMENT, ch. IX (6th ed. 1764) [hereinafter LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT]. C. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 72 (Prometheus
Books 1990) (1689) [hereinafter LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION] ("natural
ights... are not forfeitable upon account of religion"). On the influence of the
Dedaration on popular opinion, see HANDLIN, supra note 23 , at 141-42, and on the
widespread nature of legal learning, see DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMEmCANS: THE
COLONIAL EXPERiENCE 205 (1958).
26 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (governments derive
their just powers from the consent of the governed); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 37
(John Jay) ("Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government; and it
is equally undeniable that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it
some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers."). Cf. RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 226 (no citizen should have the right to delegate
power to the government to decide constitutional essentials).
27 Memorial, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 19, at 4.
28 Id. (quoting VA. CONST. art. 1).
29 /d. at 1.
30 1d. at 2.
31 See THE FEDERALIST No. 2 (John Jay), Nos. 43, 44, 52 (James Madison).
32 See DEL. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 1, 2 (1776) (government "is founded
in compact only" and the religious rights were "natural and unalienable"); MD. CONST.
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Sometimes, they also expressly adopted the social compact theory of the
creation of government.33
The social contract view also informed the debates in the House over the
religion clauses, which describe the Bill of Rights as a means of preventing the
government from interfering with inherent rights. 34 Representative Benson
declared, "The committee who framed this report [proposing amendments]
proceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to the people; they
conceived them to be inherent; and all that they meant to provide against was
their being infringed by the Government." 35 The representatives recognized
that the Bill of Rights was needed to respond to criticism from the states against
the unrestrained power of the federal government. 36
The pervasive adherence to the social contract view makes it appropriate to
consider that view in interpreting the Bill of Rights. In addition, as the state
constitutions show, social contract ideas were used to limit the power of the
state governments. 37 A fortiori, the limitations those constitutions placed on
Declaration of Rights, art. I (1776); MASS. CONST. preamble & Pt. 1 (Declaration of
Rights), art. III, para. I, H1, VII (1780) (unalienable rights; government is instituted for the
benefit of the people); N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. I-V (1784) (men have natural rights;
government is founded on the consent of the people to give up some rights in exchange for
others, but the natural rights of religion are unalienable because no equivalent can be given
for them); N.Y. CONST. art. I (1777); New York Ratification of Constitution (uly 26,
1787) (power is originally vested in the people; religious rights are unalienable); N.C.
CONST. art. 1 (1776); PA. CoNsT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTs, art. II, V (religious rights are
unalienable; government is instituted for the benefit of the people) (1776); VT. CoNsT. OF
1786, ch. 1, art. III (natural and unalienable right to worship); VA. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTs, 1 (1776) (rights cannot be surrendered on entering into society); Virginia
Ratifying Convention (June 27, 1788) (natural rights of which men cannot be deprived in a
social compact). q. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 72
("natural rights.., are not forfeitable on account of religion").
33 See DEL. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776); N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. IM
(1784); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1 (1776).
34 We do not have the Senate debates because the Senate met behind closed doors. See
1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 738 (statement of Rep. Madison, Aug. 15, 1789); McConnell,
supra note 16, at 1483.
35 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 31-32 (statement of Rep. Benson, Aug. 15, 1789); see
a/so id. at 437 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789) (distinguishing between natural
rights, inherent in the very nature of the compact, and positive rights, resulting from the
terms of the agreement, and considering rights to freedom of religion and expression as
natural rights).
36 See id. at 424-42 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789); Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833) (Marshall, CJ.).
37 See supra note 32.
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state governments should apply to the limited, federal government. 38 As
Madison observed, "If there was reason for restraining the State Governments
from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the Federal
Government." 39
2. The Unreliability of the Debates
In interpreting the Bill of Rights, the social contract view provides
important advantages over the debates. First, we know very little about the
debates. The only debates we know about were in the House of
Representatives. We know nothing about the Senate debates, because the
Senate met behind closed doors.40 "[W]e know practically nothing about what
went on in the state legislatures during the ratification process." 41
Second, even if we could safely rely on the debates we do have, the
statements of the first Congress do not resolve the conflicts about the meaning
of the religion clauses. For example, those interpreting the clauses have
disputed the Framers' intent on such fundamental issues as whether the clauses
require, permit, or prohibit exemptions. 42 They have disputed whether the
Establishment Clause protects against federal establishments or merely prevents
the federal government from interfering with state establishments. 43 This is
particularly so for the Establishment Clause, because of circular definitions in
the debates-when Madison was asked the meaning of the phrase "no religion
38 Indeed, Madison expressly stated that "every Government should be disarmed of
powers which trench upon those particular rights" including the "equal right of
conscience[.]J " 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 440-41 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8,
1789).
39 Id. at 438.
40 See id. at 738; McConnell, supra note 16, at 1483.
412 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BrLL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1171
(1971); see also McConnell, supra note 16, at 1485.
42 Compare McConnell, supra note 16 (the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions)
and Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1109 (1990) (same) with Hamburger, supra note 16 (exemptions are permitted but
not required) and PHILn' B. KURLA qD, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962) (exemptions are
prohibited).
43 Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) with Akhil R. Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J 1131, 1159 (1991) (the Free Exercise Clause
should be incorporated, but not the Establishment Clause). See also William K. Iletzau,
Rediscovering the Establishment Cause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (1990); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment
Cause. A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1700 (1992); infra note 245.
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shall be established by law,"44 Madison returned to the idea of establishment,
saying that he believed it meant "that Congress should not establish a
religion." 45 In short, the debates themselves are too equivocal to resolve this
issue, without substantial evidence extrinsic to the drafting process to explain
what the legislators meant.46 This evidence is what the social contract view
provides.
Third, the debates are of dubious value because they were not shared with
the public during the ratification process. Because ratification was essential for
enacting a constitutional amendment, the statements of members of Congress
are less relevant than they would be in interpreting a statute.47 This is
especially true of the Bill of Rights, because the impetus for them was the
dissatisfaction that the people expressed during the states' ratification of the
original Constitution.48 The ratifiers did not know even the House debates. By
contrast, the social contract view was widely shared.
The public documents circulating at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights are a better guide to the understanding of the
times than the inarticulate and perhaps inconsistent statements of individuals
about how particular cases were to be resolved.49 Using the public debates
44 1 ANNALs, supra note 24, at 729 (statement of Rep. Madison, Aug. 15, 1789). The
second part of the clause at that time continued, "nor shall the equal rights of conscience be
infringed." Id.
4 5 Id. at 730 (statement of Rep. Madison, Aug. 15, 1789). Madison's definition
continued that "[Congress should not] enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." Id. Thus, the part of the
definition that is most helpful relates to the "equal rights of conscience," which received the
greater change in the drafting process.
46 This is because "[Il]anguage is a social institution. Its successful functioning depends
upon commonly accepted responses to particular verbal symbols used in particular kinds of
contexts. These responses are social facts." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PRocEss: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKNG AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1188
(1994). See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLrIcs 112-13 (1975); Paul
Brest, Interpretaion and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
47 "In the case of a constitutional amendment [a statement in debate] is of less
materiality than in that of an ordinary bill or resolution. A constitutional amendment must
be agreed to, not only by Senators and Representatives, but it must be ratified by the
legislatures, or by conventions ..... Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
48 See 1 ANNAMS, supra note 24, at 429-33 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8,
1789); Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833) (Marshall, CJ.).
C. Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 607 (Harlan, I., dissenting) (implied pledge to adopt a Bill of
Rights).
4 9 See BAMLYN, supra note 22, at44 n.31.
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avoids the need to infer a connection between the secret, internal legislative
debates and the views of the public.50 Such public discussions therefore should
receive great weight in interpreting the Constitution. For example, The
Federalist Papers directly influenced debates in New York (where it was
written), in the surrounding states, and in Virginia, where copies of The
Federalist Papers "were rushed ... Hamilton's direction and used gratefully
by advocates of the Constitution in the climactic debate over ratification." 51
Washington praised it early,52 Jefferson later described its value,53 and Story
cited it almost constantly in his Commentaries.54 Its wide circulation suggests
that the social contract approach to government was widely shared. Madison's
widely circulated description of a law requiring people to contribute three
pence to the support of their own church as an establishment likewise suggests
that the ratifiers understood "establishment" to encompass a variety of
provisions for religion less formal than a state church. 55
50 See HART & SACKS, supra note 46, at 1379 ("Evidence of specific intention [in the
internal legislative history] with respect to particular applications is competent only to the
extent that the particular applications illuminate the general purpose and are consistent with
other evidence of it."); id. at 1378 ("The gist of this approach is to infer purpose by
comparing the new law with the old."). C. RONALD DWORK[N, TAKING RIGrrS SERIOUSLY
134-35 (1977) (constitutional rights are not confined to specific examples imagined by the
Framers, but examples are helpful in illustrating general concepts protected by the Bill of
Rights).
51 THE FEDERALIST xi (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
52 See Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 28, 1788),
reprinted in 30 THE WRrrINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 65, 66 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1939).
53 Thomas Jefferson wrote that "appeal [to The Federalist] is habitually made by all,
and rarely declined or denied by any as evidence of the general opinion of those who
framed, and of those who accepted the Constitution of the United States, on questions as to
its genuine meaning." THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1112 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1943). See also CLINTON ROSsITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE
CoNsTrrurioN 52 (1964); Ernest J. Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-
46 (1954).
54 E.g., JOSEPH STORY, Rules of Interpretation of the Constitution, in 3 COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONsTrrITION OF THE UNITED STATES § 448, at 319-20 (1858) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 83); id. § 452, at 322 n.2. Story's citation is significant because he shares,
with the Supreme Court, a limited role for interpretation through extrinsic evidence.
Compare id. § 440, at 313 n.1 (citing 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59,
60) (using a Heyden's Case formulation) with, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Lee, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 107, 118 (1839) (citing Heyden's Case).
55 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 & n.31 (1977) (quoting 2
JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (quoting Virginia Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom, Preamble, 12 VA. STAT. 84 (Hening 1823), reprinted in 1
1274 [Vol. 57:1263
SOCIAL CONTRACT NEUTRALITY
For all these reasons, judges at the time of the framing would use public
documents, but not debates, to interpret ambiguous statutes, because public
documents showed the circumstances surrounding the enactment. 56 Thus, to the
extent that the Framers had an expectation about how the Constitution should
be construed, it was that the subjective intent of the Framers should be
disregarded. Rather, the Framers intended interpreters to rely on the text, but
could in the case of ambiguity also consider public circumstances surrounding
an enactment to discern its purpose and construe it accordingly. 57
3. The Unreliability of Post Enactment Evidence
Post enactment evidence suffers from the same defects as the debates and
has two additional defects of its own. First, it does not reveal the
contemporaneous intent of the parties. Second, a constitution is intended to
limit actions by presidents, senators, and representatives.
The limiting function of the Constitution means that when a president,
senator, or representative acts in a way that the Constitution prohibits-
especially when that prohibition was enacted under state pressure, as the Bill of
Rights was-it should no more puzzle us than a party's doing something
prohibited by a contract it signed. The Framers themselves were familiar with
this phenomenon. As Madison observed during the debate over the Bill of
Rights, the state legislatures had disregarded many of the state constitutions.58
Madison himself subsequently explained that he recommended a day of
thanksgiving because of "political" pressure, despite his belief that it was
unconstitutional. 59 To use the conduct of the Congress or the President as
ANSON STOKEs, CHURcH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 392 (1950))).
56 See Heyden's Case, Co., 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARIEs *59-62. This was also the early American doctrine. Even
when the Supreme Court held that a statement "urged in debate, in regard to the meaning to
be given to a proposed constitutional amendment, or bill or resolution, does not furnish a
firm ground for its proper construction, nor is it important as explanatory of the grounds
upon which the members voted in adopting it[,]" it endorsed reliance on the "condition of
affairs out of which the occasion for its adoption may have arisen[.]" Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581, 601, 602 (1900).
57 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 904, 948 (1985) (concluding that the Framers intended interpreters to rely on
the text, not on the intent of the Framers, but would resort to extrinsic evidence).
58 See 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 439 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789).
See also Philip B. Kurland, The On'gins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 839, 852 (1986).
59 See Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in
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evidence of the meaning of the Bill of Rights is to attribute to them more
political virtue than their contemporaries in state government exercised, more
than the very concept of a Bill of Rights presupposed, or indeed more than
their own statements show that they in fact exercised.
Again, as with the debates, the post enactment conduct does not resolve the
issue. Jefferson and Madison, the two presidents most closely connected with
the religion clauses, rejected the idea of public promotion of religion, even to
the extent of believing that thanksgiving proclamations violated the separation
of church and state. Jefferson refused on separationist grounds to issue
thanksgiving proclamations. 60 Although Madison issued a proclamation, he
confessed in 1817, after leaving office, that these proclamations violated the
principles of separation for which he stood but explained-consistent with
Locke's views-that he thought this permissible because the proclamations
were "merely recommendatory" 61 and because the Constitution was not
concerned with trifles.62 Presidents Washington and Adams, on the other hand,
"recommended" days of "public thanksgiving and prayer," although some of
these preceded the adoption of the First Amendment. 63
Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has treated post enactment
evidence inconsistently. It ignored the evidence that numerous state
constitutions with free exercise clauses also contained clauses preventing clergy
from sitting in the legislature. 64 That evidence would have led the Court to
conclude that the Framers and ratifiers understood the federal Constitution's
5 PHILIp B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CoNsT=roN 105 (1987).60 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprinted
in 5 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 59, at 98-99.
61 "Recommended" was apparently thought to make a difference with respect to the
separation of church and state. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Samuel Miller
(Jan. 23, 1808) (noting that Reverend Miller only asked that Jefferson "recommend" a day
of thanksgiving), reprinted in 5 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 59, at 98-99.
62 See Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda", 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534,
559 (1946), reprinted in 5 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 59, at 105; see also LEONARD
W. LEvy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGiON AND THE FRST AMENDMENT 100
(1986).
63 See ROBERT L. CoRD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 53 (1982); 5 KURLAND
& LERNER, supra note 59, at 98-99.
64 Compare McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a statute prohibiting
ministers from serving in the legislature) ith GA. CONST. art. LVI, LXII (1776)
(respectively allowing "[all persons ... free exercise of their religion," but excluding
clergymen from the legislature); GA. CoNST. art. 10 § 5, art. 1, § 18 (1789) (same); N.Y.
CONST. art. XXXVIII, XXXIX (1777) (likewise allowing "free exercise," but excluding
clergy from legislature); N.C. CoNsT. art. XIX, XXXI, XXXIV (1776) (guaranteeing
freedom of worship, and nonestablishment, but excluding clergy from legislature).
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Free Exercise Clause to be consistent with such prohibitions. It has also
ignored the Alien and Sedition Acts in interpreting the Free Speech Clause.65
On the other hand, it relied on the first Congress's hiring of a chaplain to
justify state legislatures' hiring legislative clergy. 66
The inconsistency in the Court's treatment suggests that the Court uses this
as a makeweight rationale to justify a result that it has already reached on other
grounds. The small additional information that post enactment evidence
provides cannot overcome the flaw in its use: interpreting the Constitution
based on the belated actions of those whom the Constitution deemed
untrustworthy and sought to restrain. Using the conduct of such persons to
interpret the Constitution is little more sensible than using the conduct of
prisoners to interpret prison regulations. Certainly, such evidence should not
contradict the public, contemporaneous intent of the ratifiers and drafters, who
were the ones attempting to impose the restraint.
4. The Necessity of a Social Contract View in Adjudicating Religious
Rights
In addition to the practical and theoretical problems with relying on the
debates and post enactment evidence, there are affirmative reasons for using
fundamental doctrines, like the social contract theory of the Framers. Specific
statements in debates and examples of post enactment conduct are not always
based on the reflective consideration about the implications of general
principles, which often take many years to achieve expression or recognition.
Thus, although the United States was dedicated to the proposition that all men
are created equal, it took many years and a civil war for that proposition to
become accepted law, and even longer for some measure of political equality to
be extended to women. The reliance in some judicial opinions on specific
statements rather than inferences from general principles has caused judicial
disasters. 67
Moreover, resort to fundamental issues may be the only way to resolve the
conflict. Abstraction "is a way of continuing public discussion when shared
65 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964).
66 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983).
67 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856) (conceding
that a guarantee of equality "would seem to embrace the whole human family," but refusing
to apply it to "the enslaved African race" because Africans "were never thought of or
spoken of except as property" by "the men who framed this declaration"). The Dred Scott
decision helped precipitate the Civil War. See IAMs M. MCPHEaSON, THE BATTLE CRY OF
FREEDOM 178, 183, 188 (1988).
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understandings of lesser generality have broken down. We should be prepared
to find that the deeper the conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to which
we must ascend to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots." 68 Specific
desires of people today are in great conflict. To obtain a consensus, it may be
necessary to rely on inferences from principles about which there is no conflict.
Finally, relying on the social contract view in this context is immune from
two competing criticisms that have been advanced against this view in other
contexts. On the one hand, the social contract has been criticized as too
theoretical and unrelated to real people's needs to create duties. On the other
hand, the social contract view has been criticized as being too tied to people's
existing interests to make it a proper basis for inferring principles of justice.
The first of these criticisms have been advanced by Hume and others, who
claimed that Locke's social contract view would not bear the weight that Locke
put on it. Hume argued that the obligation to adhere to the contract required a
society and rules of justice that could not exist before the contract. 69 Others
have argued that the abstract description of the person in the idealized social
contract view means that the hypothetical consent of that person does not create
moral duties for real people. 70 However, neither of these criticisms applies to
the federal Constitution. Because society and state government existed before
the contract to form the federal government, this application of the social
contract is real, rather than ideal.
The second branch of criticism is that a social contract theory based on a
real contract is too "affected by contingencies and accidents" to provide a basis
for concluding that the contract is just merely because people consented to it.7 1
However, the Constitution, for better or worse, reflects the specific intent of
the people who adopted it, and although it may have been affected by
contingencies, the religion clauses have generally been interpreted in light of
these contingencies. 72 Indeed, even some of those who find actual social
68 RAwIS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 46.
69 See 3 DAvID HUME, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT, reprinted in PHILosoPmcAL
WORKS 455-56 (1964). For a partial response to this critique, see RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 347, which, like Locke, adopts a view that "persons are
capable of a certain natural political virtue." Id.
70 See generally MICHAEL 1. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
71 RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 287; see also G.W.F. HEGEL,
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 58-59, 70-71, 156-57, 186 (r.M. Knox trans., 1942)
(criticizing contingency and the assumption that human beings could be conceptually
isolated from society for purposes of the social contract).
72 Numerous authors have considered the role of history and the influence of specific
religious movements in advancing their interpretations of the religion clauses. See, e.g.,
TRIBE, supra note 16 § 14-3 to -5; Hamburger, supra note 16; McConell, supra note 16;
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contracts suspect because of their dependence on the initial bargaining position
of the parties may accept this social contract. 73
A related possible objection is that the Lockean view may favor a "status
quo neutrality." 74 In other contexts, some have rejected the view that the
common law status quo provides the neutral position, because that erroneously
prohibits the redistribution of money to equalize preferred rights. 75 However,
this critique of status quo neutrality has its greatest force in the area of free
speech.76 The role of free speech in politics may require redistribution so that
the political system represents people, not money.77
Once a representative political system is guaranteed, the analogous
justification for religious redistribution is much weaker, because it cannot
threaten the political system. Even many who reject a historicist approach to
determining free speech rights accept limits on redistribution to benefit people
on the grounds of religion.78 And, the Establishment Clause provides a text
prohibiting government support for religion that has no equivalent in the Free
Speech Clause.
Pepper, supra note 16, at 7.
73 Even Rawis might accept the formation of the federal government as sufficiently
voluntary to make the agreement to its formation a basis of justice, whether it is considered
as a voluntary association or as the result of an agreement among sovereign states. First,
Rawls and others agree that voluntary associations are not subject to the criticisms advanced
against Locke's social contract. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 279;
HEGEL, supra note 71, at 186. Second, Rawls believes that the difference principle outlined
in his Theory of Justice does not apply as a general rule to differences in welfare between
nations. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD
AMNEM LECTRES 1993, 75, 228 n.52 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). The
difference principle finds differences morally justified only to the extent that these
differences benefit the welfare of the least well-off. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 15, at 75-83.
74 See CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CoNsTmmoN 4 (1993).
75 See id. at 297.
76 See id. at 197-256 (criticizing the application of status quo neutrality to speech
issues).
77 See id. at 84-85 (criticizing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); see also id. at
307-08; RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 325 (wealth must be distributed
evenly so as to avoid skewing the political process).
78 See RAWLS, POLrricAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 329-30, 341. In Professor
Rawls's view, political liberties must have "fair value"-the ability, as a practical matter, to
have an influence on the result-while other liberties need not. Id. at 327 & n.35. Professor
Sunstein believes that political speech should receive primacy in free speech protections, see
SUNsTEIN, supra note 74, at 256, so the need for redistribution to equalize political speech




B. The Social Contract View and American Religious Liberty
Because of the pervasiveness of the social contract view, we must
determine what those living at the time of the framing believed its implications
were for the freedom of religion. In this respect, Locke's works were
exceptionally influential, not just to the Framers, 79 but also to many
Americans. "In pamphlet after pamphlet the American writers cited Locke on
natural rights and on the social and governmental contract ... ...o
The exploration of Locke's views serves two purposes. The first is to show
that the religious attitude held by the Framers is not adventitious, but follows
from the basic premises of a social contract view. Second, the widespread
circulation of Locke's views provides added weight to the contention that the
understanding of the Framers on this point was shared by the public. For both
these reasons, we can argue securely from the widespread adherence to a social
contract view of the Lockean sort to the beliefs of the people at large about the
permissible power of government. Moreover, early court decisions also show
the influence of Lockean reasoning. 8'
The Framers' and Lockean social contract view has the important
consequence that the Framers, because they believed that the government
existed to secure inherent rights, allowed the government to interfere with
someone's religious practices only when that interference was necessary to
protect the rights of others. Similarly, the Framers necessarily rejected the
contention that religious claims could justify invading the rights of others.
79 See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, in 2 WRIrINGS OF JEFERSON 94,
99-103 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1893) (reproducing portions of Locke's Letter Concerning
Toleration verbatim but without attribution); WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 3-4,
64-65 (1985); LEO PFEFFER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 13 (1977) (similar); Lance Banning,
James Madison, the Statute for Religious Freedom, and the Crisis of Republican
Convictions, in THE VGINI STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EvOLUION AND
CONSEQUENCEs IN AMERICAN HISTORY 109, 118 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan
eds., 1988); Robert A. Rutland, James Madison's Dream: A Secular Republic, in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LmERTY 199, 203 (1985); David C. Williams & Susan I.
Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 869 (1991)
(similar parallelism for Madison).
80 BALYN, supra note 22, at 27; see also id. at 58-59 (discussing the American
colonists' acceptance of social contract theory of government); RICHARDS, supra note 24, at
90 ("The American revolutionary and constitutional minds ... framed their enterprises on
the basis of Lockean political theory... ."); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 282-91 (1969) (describing the increasing importance of
Locke's social contract theory in American political thinking after 1776, especially in the
drafting of state constitutions).
81 See infra Part II.B.3.
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Consequently, the government did not have the power to allow an individual to
harm others, even if that individual claimed that his religious beliefs conferred
a right to harm others. Finally, the social contract view implied that the line
between permissible and impermissible governmental regulation was not the
line between belief and action, but the difference between conduct that did not
affect others and conduct that did.
1. Religious Liberty, John Locke's Social Contract, and American
Constitutionalism Before the Framing
According to Locke, a magistrate could only seek "the temporal good and
outward prosperity of the society." 8 2
[I]t does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his sword in punishing
every thing, indifferently, [including]... uncharitableness, idleness, and
many other things ... because they are not prejudicial to other men's rights,
nor do they break the public peace of societies. Nay, even the sins of lying and
pejury are nowhere punishable by laws; unless in certain cases, in which the
real turpitude of the thing, and the offense against God, are not considered, but
only the injury done unto men's neighbors, and to the commonwealth.83
Thus, "natural rights .. .are not forfeitable on account of religion."8 4
Religion-even false religion-was outside the proper sphere of government,
because it could not, by itself, injure one's neighbors. Locke wrote,
"[R]eligion; which, whether it be true or Ualse, does no prejudice to the
worldly concerns of their fellow-subjects, which are the things that only belong
unto the care of the commonwealth." 85 Therefore, he concluded, religion "has
no relation to the end of civil government." 6
The magistrate could not intervene even on the grounds that the
individual's conduct was doing herself harm. "Laws provide," Locke said, "as
much as is possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the
fraud or violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence or ill
husbandry of the possessors themselves." 87 In a hypothetical case remarkably
close to Employment Division v. Smith, Locke endorsed a result inconsistent
with the result of the Smith Court, because he regarded "consuming [one's]
82 LOCKE, A LLTFER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 59.
83 Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 72.
85 Id. at 60.
86 Id.
87 ld. at 35.
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substance in taverns" as a "private domestic affairfl" as to which "every man
may consider what suits his own conveniency, and follow what course he likes
best."88
Because Locke so severely restricted the proper scope of government
activity, he had little need for exemptions for religiously motivated conduct to
protect religion. Thus, Locke's rejection of exemptions89 must be read against
his limitations on proper government, which meant that the government could
not legitimately demand conduct that would violate claims of conscience, unless
those claims of conscience interfered with other people's rights. Because,
Locke concluded, the magistrate could only seek to protect against things
"prejudicial to other men's rights" or that "break the public peace of
societies," little that a magistrate could demand would "appeari] contrary to the
conscience of a private person." 90
Locke did not believe the government had the authority to advance
religion. Rather, Locke concluded, religion "has no relation to the end of civil
government." 91 This conclusion followed from his conclusion that no one
could "invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other, upon pretense
of religion." 92 If individuals could not take the rights and goods of one another
to promote religion, the government, succeeding to the rights of individuals,
likewise could not. As Locke wrote, "Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single
persons, nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just title to
invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other, upon pretense of
religion." 93
Although Locke did state that the magistrate "may certainly do what any
good man to do," 94 reading this as allowing the magistrate to use state
authority to promote religion would be inconsistent with the inability of citizens
and governments to make demands on others upon pretense of religion.
Locke's use of "man" in A Letter Concerning Toleration95 to define the
magistrate's powers suggests as much, because no ordinary citizen would have
the power to take another's money to support religion. Moreover, Locke uses
the phrase "magistrate" to refer to officials acting in their own persons, rather
than the whole government. Locke distinguished between "magistrate" and the
government, suggesting that he distinguished between the magistrate's own
88 Id. at 33.
89 See id. at 47; McConnell, supra note 16, at 1435.
90 LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 59.
91 Id. at 60.
92 Id. at 31.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 20.
95 LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25.
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rights and the magistrate's use of the government.96 At any rate, Madison and
Hamilton in The Federalist Papers and Madison in the debates used
"magistrate" to denote government officials, suggesting that this was the
understanding the Framers placed upon Locke's writing.97 Jefferson also
apparently adhered to this view, writing to Madison, "I know but one code of
morality for men whether acting singly or collectively." 98
To summarize Locke's view: The sole concern of government was
preventing an invasion of the rights of others. Government could not prevent
an individual from hurting herself-such as dissipating her wealth and health in
a tavern. Because the sole concern of government was preventing an invasion
of the rights of others, religion had no relation to government. A government
could not impose disabilities on individuals because of their religion, because
such disabilities would have no relation to preventing an invasion of the rights
of others. Thus, an individual could not be discriminated against on the basis of
her religion. On the other hand, an individual could not advance claims against
others on the basis of her religion, either. The government likewise could not
promote religion. To do so would allow it to take money from some of the
citizens to promote the views of other citizens, something no citizen could do.
Officials in government, however, could adhere to their own religious views
96 See LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 25, at 202
(distinguishing between superior and inferior magistrates); id. at 89 (distinguishing
between "government," "the legislative," and "magistrates appointed by it [the
legislative]"). But see Michael W. McConnel, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
Cm. L. REv. 115, 159 n. 201 (1992) (citing LOCKE, THE SECONIy TREATISE OF
GOvERNMENT, supra note 25, at 208) ("Locke's language may lead some modern readers
to think he is talking of the government official's right to speak in his private capacity (for
example, a president referring to God in a speech). But in context it is plain that by
"magistrate" Locke meant the government-not the government official.").
97 Hamilton described the President as a "single magistrate" and the "Chief
Magistrate." THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 415, 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). Madison described the President as the executive magistrate. See id. No. 47
passim (James Madison); see also id. No. 46, at 297 (fames Madison) (chief magistrates of
state). Madison, in discussing the need for a Bill of Rights in the debates, used Lockean
language in advocating "effectual provisions against the encroachments on particular
rights... interposed between [the people] and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign
power .... " 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 433 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789).
98 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 107, 111 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895). This sort of thought
may be taken as characteristic of the Framers. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 115,
116 ("What is true of every member of society individually, is true of them all collectively,
since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of the rights of individuals.").
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and act on their own to promote them, just as a private citizen could.
One reason for Locke's enormous influence on the Americans' concept of
religious liberty99 may have been because his social contract views were
consistent with American doctrines going back to the Mayflower Compact. In
Massachusetts, the Puritans "drew upon and developed the theory of social
covenant .... "100 Their imagery and language of separation were similar to
Locke's. Even in 1650, well before Locke, and even in Massachusetts, the last
state to abandon establishment, 101 it was "unlawful for" the Magistrates "to
compel their subjects to become church-members" or for "church-officers to
meddle with the sword of the Magistrate .... "10 2 The church authorities had
no power to "degrad or depose any man from any Civill dignities, office, or
Authoritie he shall have in the Commonwealth." 103 The Massachusetts church
leadership also recognized this. The Cambridge Synod and Platform of 1648
stated, "Church-government stands in no opposition to civil government of
comon-welths, nor any intrencheth upon the authority of Civil Magistrates in
their jurisdictions . . . ."14 Thus, in 1640 Thomas Lechford wrote, "The
Magistrates, and Church-leaders, labour for a just and equall correspondence in
jurisdictions, not to intrench one on the other." 10 5
Parallel language to Locke's view may also be found in other jurisdictions,
which also distinguished between what was appropriate for the civil magistrate
and what was appropriate for the church. Roger Williams, founder of Rhode
Island, believed that "the conscience of the Civill Magistrate... bound [him]
to preserve the civil! peace and quiet of the place and people under him." 1' 6
However, "[t]o batter downe Idolatry, false worship, heresie, schisme,
99 See supra notes 79-80.
100 GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND ATiTHORrrY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 19
(1960).
101 See 1 STOKEs, supra note 55, at 426-27.
102 CAMBRIDCE SYNOD AND PLATFORM OF 1648, reprinted in WILLISTON WALKER,
THE CREEDS AND PLATFORMS OF CONGREGATIONALISM 235-36 (1969).
103 Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony 60 (1641); see also HAsKINs, supra note
100, at 62. Conversely, although the "civill Authoritie hath power and libertie to see the
peace, ordinances, and Rules of Christ observed in every church," it could do so only "in a
Civill and not in an Ecclesiastical way." Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony 58 (1641).
On the function of the Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony, see HASKINS, supra note 100,
at 129-32.
10 4 CAMBRIDGE SYNOD AND PLATFORM OF 1648, reprinted in WALKER, supra note
102, at 235-36.
105 HAsKINS, supra note 100, at 62, 246 n.110 (citing Thomas Lechford "Plain
Dealing: or Newes from New-England," Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. 3rd ser., nf, 74 (1833)).
106 Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenet of Persecution (1647), in PERRY MILLER &
THOMAS H. JOHNSON, THE PURrANs 222-23 (1963) (emphasis in original).
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blindnesse, hardnesse ... [those] spirituall strong holds in the soules of men,
Spirituall Artillery and weapons are proper ... [and] civill weapons are
improper... and never able to effect ought in the soale."10 7
Locke's influence may have been enhanced by the Americans' creation of
judicial review, which removed one of the obstacles to the application of
Lockean analysis to religious liberty: Locke's belief that a dispute between the
magistrate and the citizen could, in the last analysis, be resolved only by an
"appeal to heaven"-Locke's euphemism for revolution.10 8 The American
Constitution, by providing for judicial review, allowed the courts to be
interposed between the power-seeking legislative and executive branches and
the citizen. 1 9 Madison, in discussing the need for a Bill of Rights in the
debates, used Lockean language in advocating "effectual provisions against the
encroachments on particular rights... interposed between [the people] and the
magistrate who exercises the sovereign power ..... 110 These limitations,
Madison continued, would allow the "independent tribunals of justice" to
"consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights."' I '
2. The Social Contract and Religious Liberty During the Framing
Like Locke, the Framers believed that the government could neither
abridge nor confer rights on the basis of religion and that conduct that did not
affect others was beyond the reach of the government. The rule that the rights
of no sect could be invaded prevented the government from interfering with
religion. The rule that no sect could invade another's rights prevented the
government from promoting religion. Because true religion would not call on
its adherents to invade the rights of others, these rules were not in conflict. Just
as Locke wrote that religion "has no relation to the end of civil
government,"" 2 Madison could conclude in his Memorial and Remonstrance
that "Religion [was] not within the cognizance of Civil Government." 113
107 Id. at 223.
108 See McConnell, supra note 16, at 1442.
10 9 See THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 117 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); id. No. 44, at 285-86 (James Madison); id. No. 78, at 466-69 (Alexander
Hamilton).
110 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 433 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789).111 Id. at 439.
112 LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 60.
113 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 19, at 8. Madison later wrote
that "the rights of conscience are not surrendered to the state." See also Letter from James
Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), 9 WRrIiNGS OF JAMES MADISON 484 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910), reprinted in 5 KURLAD & LERNER, supra note 59, at 107.
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I quote Madison here only as an example, because of the Memorial's role
as an authoritative guide to the meaning of the religion clauses. 114 As the
following discussion shows, this view of the relation of religion and
government was widely held and explains why so many of the Framers
believed the guarantees of freedom of religion were implicit in the original
Constitution.
a. Prohibition of Acts that Do Not Harm Others
Like Locke, the Framers believed that the government could not prohibit
acts that did not harm others. Madison equated protection of religion, person,
and property, and required a just government to prevent any sect from invading
the rights of another. In his widely circulated Memorial, he wrote, "[A just]
government will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment
of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his
property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any
Sect to invade those of another." 115 These considerations led Madison to
conclude in his Memorial that "Religion [was] not within the cognizance of
Civil Government." 116 In later years, Madison wrote of the "immunity of
Religion from civil jurisdiction, in every case where it does not trespass on
private rights or the public peace." 117
Jefferson's views were similar. In the Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom,118 adopted in Virginia as a declaration of fundamental natural rights,
Jefferson wrote "that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil
government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts
against peace and good order."119 In Jefferson's Notes on the State of
Virginia,120 he wrote, "The legitimate powers of government extend to such
acts only as are injurious to others." 121
114 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 passim (1962).
115 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 19, at 8.
116Id
.
117 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), repinted in 5
KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 59, at 105.
118 Thomas Jefferson, A BILL FOR ESTABLISING RELIGIouS FREEDOM (June 12, 1779),
in 5 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 59, at 77 (codified as 12 VA. STAT. 84 (Hening 1823)
in 1 STOKES, supra note 55, at 392).
119 Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 12 VA. STAT. 84 (Hening 1823)
(emphasis supplied) in 1 STOKES, supra note 55, at 392.
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The Framers' social contract view rejected the idea that the government
could prohibit conduct that caused only psychic harm, harm caused by the
knowledge that someone was behaving in a way that one believed improper. 122
In Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, he wrote, "The legitimate powers
of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does
me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." 123 Jefferson's Notes on the State of
Virginia were sufficiently widely circulated at the time of the framing to be
discussed at length in The Federalist Papers, which were intended for a New
York audience.124 Moreover, Jefferson used identical words on other
occasions, so others may. have learned Jefferson's views from other sources. 125
Similarly, Madison noted that the state would protect "Religion with the same
equal hand which protects his person and his property"-suggesting that the
state would not protect against hurt feelings. 126
The social contract model's limitations on state power were expressed in
many of the state constitutions adopted at about the time of the framing. Most
of these constitutions expressly preclude the use of "free exercise" to disturb
122 Some have argued that psychic harm is indistinguishable from other forms of
harm. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEaTING OF AmECA: THE PoLmcAL SEDUCTION
OF Tim LAw 257-58 (1990). Professor Bork specifically claims that there is no way to
distinguish between the pain of torture and the feelings a religious bigot has from knowing
that couples are using contraception, id., but he does not attempt to show that his claim is
consistent with the intent of the Framers, on which he elsewhere relies. Distinguishing
between torture of animals from mere psychic pain is nothing novel. As Gray observed long
ago, "acts of cruelty, for instance, towards beasts, may be forbidden, at least conceivably,
for the sake of the beasts themselves." JOHN CHMPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF
TME LAW 141 (2d ed. 1921). For a critique of Bork on Aristotelian grounds, see Martha C.
Nussbaum, Skepticisa About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L.
REy. 714, 730 (1994). One reason for Bork's failure is that he understands the Constitution
as a positivist, but the Framers were natural law theorists. See HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CoNsTTUTION 56 (1994).
123JEFFERSON, supra note 120 (emphasis added). C. RAWLS, PoLrnCAL LiBERALISM,
supra note 15, at 190 (strong feelings do not create the basis for entitlements); DWORIN,
supra note 50, at 276 (utilitarianism, to be workable, must exclude utility functions that
depend on other individual's utility); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 191, 223 n.14 (1980). But see generally GuiDo CALABREsI, IDEALS, BELmFS,
AT'rruDES AND THE LAW 69-86 (1985). However, even Calabresi concedes that imposing
fundamental values on another person "becomes close to intolerable." Id. at 87.
124 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 49 (James Madison).
125 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808) reprinted
in 5 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 59, at 98-99.
126 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 25, at 8.
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others. 127 These clauses undermine Employment Divsion v. Smith for three
reasons. First, if Smith had been correct in concluding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not protect action from general state laws, these provisions would
be superfluous, so their very existence implies that Smith was wrong. On the
social contract view, these clauses do make sense-they guard against claims
by those adhering to religious views that purported to confer rights to harm
others. Second, because the Framers and ratifiers did not intend to give the
limited federal government more power over religion than the states
possessed, 128 their limit on state power implies a similar limit on federal
power. Finally, the language of "free exercise" in the First Amendment would
naturally be read by ratifiers as being in accord with the existing understanding
of free exercise in the state constitutions. 129
127 See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 2-3 (1776) ("Free Exercise" and limitation,
respectively); MD. CoNsT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § XXXIII (1776); MASS. CONST., pt.
I-DEARATION OF RImstTs, art. 1 (1780); N.H. CONST. art. V (1780); N.Y. CoNsT. art.
XXXVIII (1777) ("free exercise" and limitations); N.C. CONST. (1778); N.C. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1 (1790); R.L CHARTER (1663); S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("free exercise" and
limitations). Two other constitutions had earlier expressly limited free exercise rights in the
fashion of the other states, but later dropped the restriction. Compare GA. CONST. art. LVI
(1776) (conferring "free exercise" rights "provided it be not repugnant to the peace and
safety of the State") with GA. CONST. art. 10, § 5 (1789) (using otherwise identical
language, but omitting the "peace and safety" clause); compare MD. CONST. (1776)
(providing free exercise rights "unless, under colour of religion, any man should disturb the
good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure
others, in their natural, civil, or religious rights") with MND. CONST. (1780) (rewriting the
constitutional guarantees and omitting the "peace and safety" clause).
128 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
12 9 Professor Hamburger has argued that these clauses should be interpreted as having
the same meaning as the phrase "contra pacem," which defined the criminal offenses over
which the English King's or Queen's Bench had jurisdiction, and which would be satisfied
in any criminal case. See Hamburger, supra note 16, at 918 (citing Queen v. Lane, 6 Mod.
128, 87 Eng. Rep. 884 (Q.B. 1704)). From this, he concludes that the Framers did not
intend a right of religious exemption, and he specifically criticizes McConnell. See id. 16at
916 & n.3 (citing McConnell, supra note 16 (the Free Exercise Clause requires
exemptions), and McConnell, supra note 42 (same)).
There are several objections to Professor Hamburger's argument. First, Professor
Hamburger's reading of the clauses, to mean that they had no application in any criminal
case, renders them almost meaningless as a restraint on governmental power.
Second, the phrase "contra pacem" was used in England to invoke the jurisdiction of
the King's or Queen's Bench, and avoid the local feudal courts. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 9, 13 (2d ed. 1979). The colonies did not have
local, feudal courts, so this use of the phrase would have been unfamiliar to colonials.
Third, Blackstone's Cormentaries use "breach of the peace" in an entirely different
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The Framers found the language of "free exercise" fully protective of
religion because they believed that religion, properly defined, was consistent
with social duties. Jefferson's famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association
stated that a person "'has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties.'" 130 Because of this, Jefferson continued, it was possible for the Bill of
Rights to build "a wall of separation between church and State."131 In this, the
Framers again followed Locke, who had concluded that because the magistrate
could only seek to protect against things "prejudicial to other men's rights" or
that "break the public peace of societies," little that a magistrate could demand
would "appear[] contrary to the conscience of a private person." 132
b. Governmental Promotion of Religion
The second implication of the view that government could neither interfere
with the private exercise of religion nor give benefits on the grounds of religion
was that the government could not promote religion.' 33 For the Framers, the
and narrower sense. 4 BLACKTONE'S COMMENTARIES *142-60. Blackstone is a better guide
to the colonists' intent, because it was both far more widely circulated and more relied upon
in American than the five-line 1702 Queen's Bench decision in Queen v. Lane on which
Professor Hamburger relies for his definition. Some 2500 copies of Blackstone's
Conrwentauies had been sold in America prior to 1776. EDWARD S. CORWiN, LIBERTY
AGAINST GOVERNMENT 53 (1948). Blackstone was among the legal sources read and cited
by the colonists, see, e.g., WOOD, supra note 80, at 7, 14, including John Adams, Nathaniel
Green, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and Patrick Henry, see Dennis R.
Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual
hmpact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731, 743-45 (1976). Blackstone's Commentaries was read as
precedent for the point under discussion in The Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST No.
69, supra note 97, at 418 n.*, 419 n.* (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 84 (Alexander
Hamilton). Blackstone's Commentaries also served as precedent for the point at issue in a
debate on the floor of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention. See 1 JOHN B. McMASTER &
FREDERICK D. STONE, PENNsYLvAN AD THE FEDERAL CONSTITmON 1787-1788, 360-
61 (1888).
130 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen
S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut
(Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in 8 WRIrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Henry A. Washington
ed., 1861), quoted in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
131 Id.
13 2 LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 59.
133 Some have argued that the right not to be burdened on the basis of religion can be
derived from the right against governmental promotion of religion, so that prohibiting
governmental promotion provides full protection for religion. See Gail Merel, The
Protection of Individual Owice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First
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chief reason for objecting to the government promotion of religion was the
interference it caused to individuals' rights. James Madison, the First
Amendment's author, wrote in defense of religious liberty in his Memorial and
Remonstrance: "Who does not see ... [t]hat the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of
any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever?" 134 Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious
Freedom agreed that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."1 35
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 36
is especially important in determining how the Framers and ratiflers understood
the Establishment Clause, because it uses the phrase "establishment" to
describe a Virginia statute that would have compelled property holders to
contribute three pence to the church of the contributor's choice. 137 Madison's
description of compelled support of one's own church as an establishment in
the widely circulated Memorial suggests that the Framers and ratifiers would
have understood the Establishment Clause as prohibiting such support. The title
of the bill itself, which describes it as the "Establishing" provision for teachers
of the Christian religion, is also suggestive on this point.' 38 If the compulsory
support of one's own religion was a prohibited establishment-although there
would be no penalty for belonging to a particular religious group, no adverse
persuasive effect, and no differential treatment of the members of the
religions-compulsory support of another's religion would certainly be
prohibited.
The harm caused by government's promotion of religion comprised not
only the deprivation of a person's property in order to support another's
Amendment, 45 U. C. L. Rnv. 805 (1978). However, this view fails to provide full
protection. If the rewards attached to one set of beliefs encourage the profession of that
belief, making disassociation between the effects on believers and beliefs impossible, the
legislature can corrupt the marketplace of religious ideas indirectly by making some
religious beliefs more attractive to hold than others. On the other hand, if rewards or
punishments do not alter people's religious beliefs, the theory, which is based on the need to
avoid governmental promotion of religion, would provide no grounds to object to the
distribution of penalties or benefits on the basis of religion.
134 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 25, at 186.
135 Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, Preamble, 12 VA. STAT. 84
(Hening 1823), in 1 STOKES, supra note 55, at 392. Here again, the Framers were following
Locke.
136 For the Memorial's role as an authoritative guide to the meaning of the religion
clauses, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 passim (1962).
137 See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 25, at 3, 6, 7, 8, 9.
1 3 8 See id.
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religion, but also the disadvantage that it caused those of competing views.
Madison objected to a statute exempting Quakers and Mennonites in part
because this exemption would enable them to attract adherents. Madison asked,
"Ought their Religions to be endowed above all others, with extraordinary
privileges, by which proselytes may be enticed from all others?"' 3 9
The Framers also objected to the governmental promotion of religion
because it could contribute to future tyrannies. Madison wrote in The Federalist
Papers, "In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as
that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of
interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects." 140 Thus, Madison
continued, "The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of
interests and Sects ... ."141 Such views were a common part of political
discourse at the time.142
Although some might fear that this view would deprive religion of
necessary support, that was not the view of the Framers. Madison and other
religious individuals in early America believed that religion benefited by
freedom from government money. As Madison wrote in his Memorial and
Remonstrance, "[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments,
instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary
operation." 143 Many shared this view. 144 Some also feared the support a state-
139 Id. at 4.
140 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51,
supra note 24, at 324 (James Madison)).
141 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 24, at 324 (James Madison); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 130-31 (William T.
Hutcheson ed., 1977) (making similar multiplicity of sects argument).
A proponent of wealth- or utility-maximization might favor the availability of a variety
of religious views, because it increased the possibilities of consuming religion and the
satisfaction that consumers of religion derived from them. See RicHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOCC ANALYSIS OF LAw 678-79 (3d ed. 1992). Neither Locke nor the Framers
adhered to this view, because they regarded religion as a matter of truth. See, e.g., LOCKE,
A IEr CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 60; Virginia Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom, 12 VA. STAT. 84 (Hening 1823), in 1 STOKES, supra note 55, at 392.
There is no evidence that they would have regarded individuals as benefitting from their
adherence to a false religion, even if it made them feel better.
142 See ADAMSMrrH, THE WEALTH OFNATIONS, Bk. 5, ch. 1, pt. 3, art. 3 (1776).
143 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 25, at 7.
144 See 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONvENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTITvrION 194 (1836) (statement of James Iredell,
subsequently a Supreme Court Justice); Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenet of Persecution
(1647), in 1 PERRY MILLER & THOMAS JOHNSON, THE PurrANS 222-23 (1963). See
generally McConnell, supra note 16, at 1442-43.
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aided church could lend to monarchy.' 45 Consequently, most of the Framers
believed that keeping the government from supporting religion benefited
religion. This view was shared by later observers. Alexis de Tocqueville
reported in Democracy in America 46 that all clergymen
agreed with each other except about details; all thought that the main reason for
the quiet sway of religion over their country was the complete separation of
church and state. I have no hesitation in stating that throughout my stay in
America I met nobody, lay or cleric, who did not agree about that. 147
This rejection of the possibility that the federal government could treat
religion specially is consistent with the Framers' rejection of other attempts to
allow the federal government to promote morality. Morris proposed allowing
Congress to "promote useful learning and inculcate sound morality"; the
proposal was defeated. 148 Mason proposed allowing Congress to adopt
sumptuary laws, 149 the proposal was rejected. 50 In a subsequent attempt to
introduce the subject, it was sent to a committee15' and rejected again when it
was reported out. 152 A proposal to allow Congress to create a university was
also rejected.153 The Framers of the Constitution believed, as Madison stated in
145 "[Tihe revolutionaries had identified the dominant pre-war church with the
monarchy." WOOD, supra note 21, at 17-18.
146 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer, ed. &
George Lawrence trans., 1969) (translating the thirteenth edition of the original,
published in 1850, the last version in Tocqueville's life).
147 Id. 295. At that time, law and public opinion entirely excluded the clergy from a
career in politics. See id. at 496; see also, e.g., id. at 445, 545-46 ("state religions... are
always sooner or later fatal for the church").
148 See JAMEs MADISON, NoTEs OF DEBATES IN mE FEDERAL CoNvENToN oF 1787
(1984) (Aug. 20, 1787), reprinted in THEMAKING OFTH AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE GREAT
DOCUMENTS 1774-1789 109, 573 (Charles Callan Tansill ed., 1927). The preamble's
declaration that one of the goals of the Constitution was to "promote the general Welfare"
did not expand the powers of the federal government so as to alter this result. Although
"[tihe importance of examining the preamble... [is] universally conceded," STORY, supra
note 51 § 459, at 326, the preamble cannot enlarge the powers. See id. § 462, at 327-28.
Moreover, in discussing the general welfare, Story refers to roads, bridges, and the like, not
improvement of morals. See id. §§ 497-507.
149 See MADISON, Norms OF DEBATES, reprinted in MAKNG OF THE AMmCAN
REPUBLIC, supra note 148, at 109, 574.
150 See id.
IS1 See id. at 714.
15 2 See PAPERS OF DR. JAMES MCHENRY ON THE FEDERAL CONvENTION OF 1787,
reprinted in MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 148, at 940.
15 3 See MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, reprinted in MAKING OF TE AMERICAN
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the federal convention, that "[tihe primary objects of civil society are the
security of property and public safety." 154 In the words of the Constitution and
an early post framing commentator, establishing religion or prohibiting its free
exercise did not "promote the general welfare."' 55
The state constitutions prevailing at the adoption of the Bill of Rights
support the same social-contract-based restrictions. Most of the state
constitutions drafted at about the time of the framing 156 expressly prohibited
any compulsory support. 157 All of the rest, except New York, prohibited
compelling a citizen to support a religion other than the one the citizen
professed.' 58 New York's constitution guaranteed free exercise and
nondiscrimination among religions, prohibiting support for another's sect, but
not expressly resolving the issue of compulsory support for one's own sect. 159
c. Implicit Rights
The social contract view of the Framers explains the Framers' belief that
the original Constitution implicitly guaranteed freedom of religion. 160 They
REPuBLIC, supra note 148, at 725.
154 Notes of Major William Pierce G.A. in the Federal Convention of 1787, in 3 AM.
HiST. REV. 317-34 (1898) (statement of Mr. Madison June 6, 1787), reprinted in MAKiNG
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 148, at 87, 95.
155 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEw OF THE CoNSTrrUrION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 121 (2d ed. 1829), reprinted in 5 KuwLANm & LERNER, supra note 59, at 106.
156 Rhode Island and Connecticut did not alter their colonial charters until substantially
after the Revolution and the drafting of the Constitution.
157 Eight states prohibited support entirely. See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 2
(1776); GA. CONST. art. LVI (1776); GA. CONST. art. 10, § 5 (1789); N.J. CONST. art.
XVIII (1776); N.C. CONST. art. XXXIV (1776); PA. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS I If
(1776); S.C. CONST. art. VII (1790); VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 1 (1786).
158 The three states that expressly permitted compulsory support required support only
for one's own sect. See MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXXIII (1776); MASS.
CONST. Pt. 1 (Declaration of Rights), art. III, para. 4 (1780); N.H. CONST. art. VI (1784).
159 New York's constitution does not expressly resolve the issue: "ITIhe right of free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
prejudice shall forever after be allowed within this State, to all mankind." N.Y. CONsT. art.
XXXVIII (1777). Subsequent court interpretations suggest that any coercion at all was
prohibited. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811).
160 See 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 438 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789)
("[]n the Federal Government [a declaration of rights is] unnecessary, because the powers
are enumerated... and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum
was thrown into the hands of the Government."). Numerous other examples of the same
principle occur. The following are taken from debates over what became the First
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understood the powers of government to be limited to the prevention of harm
to others and believed that religion could not cause others harm. Because the
theory of an implicit guarantee of rights depended on the social contract view,
the widespread adherence to the implicit rights view strongly suggests that the
social contract interpretation of the religion clauses is correct.161
This view of rights as implicit was not limited to the Constitutional
Convention. The first two state ratifications of the Constitution that suggested
amendments to safeguard rights proposed nothing about freedom of religion,
speech, or press. 162 Instead, they dealt solely with positive rights-taxation,
exclusivity of merchant companies, the rate of interest paid by the states on
debts to the federal government, trial by jury, and the like.' 63 Because it is
difficult to believe that the ratifiers in these states thought all these provisions
were more important than the freedom of religion, speech, and press, the
Amendment. See id. at 442 (statement of Rep. Jackson, June 8, 1789) ("There is no power
given to Congress to regulate this subject [the liberty of the press] as they can commerce, or
peace, or war."); id. at 730 (statement of Rep. Sherman, Aug. 15, 1789) ("I1ihe
amendment [was] altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as Congress had no authority whatever
delegated to them by the Constitution to make religious establishments."); iU at 732
(statement of Rep. Hartley, Aug. 15, 1789); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-14
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("For why declare that things shall not
be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty
of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed?"); THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 97, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating
that the President "has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction.").
161 Religious rights were natural, "pre-existent rights of nature, ... retained when
particular powers are given up to be exercised by the Legislature." 1 ANNALS, supra note
24, at 437 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789). See also Jefferson's Virginia Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom, 12 VA. STAT. 84 (Hening 1823); Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance, supra note 25, at 4 (quoting VA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 1).162 See Massachusetts Ratification (Feb. 6, 1778), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 93-96 (1894); South
Carolina Ratification (May 23, 1778), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTrrTUION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 138-40 (1894).
163 Positive rights, like the right to "[tirial by jury[,] cannot be considered as a natural
right, but a right resulting from a social compact." 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 437
(statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789). Religious rights were natural, "pre-existent
rights of nature," "retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the
Legislature." Id. In their differentiation between natural and positive rights, the Framers
again followed Locke. Part of the power given up in the transition from the state of nature,
according to Locke, is "the power to punish crimes." LOCKE, THE SEcOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 25, at 128. The citizen instead acquires the duty of assisting
"the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require." Id. at 130. Thus,
procedural rights relating to the enforcement of the laws are positive, not natural.
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ratifications suggest strongly that many of the ratifiers believed that the original
Constitution sufficiently safeguarded these freedoms. 164 That, in turn, suggests
that many of the ratifiers adhered to the social contract view's provision of
implicit rights.
One might argue that the social contract view's prohibition of the
compulsory transfers of money to support religion extended only to direct
transfers from one person to another, and not to the government's use of
money compelled from individuals. However, this view runs against the
frequently repeated idea that governments were to have no more power than
individuals. As Jefferson wrote to Madison, "I know but one code of morality
for men whether acting singly or collectively. " 165
Moreover, the Framers expressly rejected this limitation in hiring and
conscription, confirming that the government's conduct could not escape
scrutiny by acting indirectly. With respect to the government's power to
influence people through patronage, the Religious Test Clause in the original
Constitution avoided this possible limitation of the structural guarantees. 166
With respect to conscription, the Framers rejected a constitutional right of
exemption. Although the Framers recognized that the government needed
money and people to carry out its functions as part of the quid pro quo
whereby one obtained a government to defend one's rights, 167 these demands
164 Of course, the provision of express constitutional guarantees need not imply
rejection of implicit rights. As Patrick Henry observed in the Virginia Ratification
Convention, express guarantees avoided compelling people to rely on syllogisms for their
rights. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNvENTIoNs ON THE
ADOPTION OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 316-18 (1834) (statement of June 12, 1788), in 5
KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 59, at 103.
165 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), reprinted in 5
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 98, at 111. This sort of thought may be
taken as characteristic of the Framers. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
98, at 116 ("What is true of every member of society individually, is true of them all
collectively, since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of the rights of
individuals.").
166 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.").
167 "Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government; and it is
equally undeniable that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it
some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers." THE FEDERALIST No.
2, supra note 26, at 37 (John Jay). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 210 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[IThe exigencies of the Union [for taxation] could
be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination."); THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 154
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (suggesting that one of the main purposes
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could also differentially burden those who had conscientious objections to
warfare. In the debates over what became the Second Amendment, the draft
originally included a provision that "no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms." 168 The principal objection was to the provision of an
exemption.1 69 Representative Jackson believed that it would be "unjust" for
"one part" of the United States "to defend the other in case of invasion." 170 He
proposed that anyone personally refusing be required to pay an equivalent. 171
Others agreed.172 Representative Benson opposed the exemption, arguing that
no one could "claim this indulgence of right" because it "is no natural right,
and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Government." 173 Others
observed that many would be as conscientiously scrupulous about procuring a
substitute as they would be about serving themselves.' 74 A motion to strike out
the provision for conscientious objection apparently failed, 22 to 24.175
Although the close vote indicates that the provision was controversial from the
start, because most of the representatives did not speak during the debates, we
do not know for certain why the clause was ultimately dropped. However, the
contrast between this and the other debates over religion-which concerned
details of phrasing to achieve an agreed-upon result-suggests that many
adhered to Representative Benson's view that exemption from military service
was not a natural right, perhaps because, as Representative Jackson observed, it
would impose unequal burdens depending on one's religious views. 176
The distinction that the representatives evidently made between the
protection provided against government conduct that did not harm others and
the absence of protection from government demands for services further
supports the conclusion that the Framers believed that there was a structural
guarantee of religious freedom in the initial Constitution. In their view, this
guarantee did not provide exemptions as a natural right, but it did provide as a
of the new federal Constitution was to enable the easier levying of troops).
168 1 ANNALS. supra note 24, at 749.
169 Various objections were made to the phrasing and to the propriety of requiring, or
not, the procurement of a substitute. See id. at 749-51.
170 Id. at 750 (statement of Rep. Jackson, Aug. 17, 1789).
171 See id.
172 See id. (statement of Rep. Smith, Aug. 17, 1789).
173 Id. at 751 (statement of Rep. Benson, Aug. 17, 1789).
174 See id. at 750 (statement of Rep. Sherman, Aug. 17, 1789); id. at 751 (statement
of Rep. Vining, Aug. 17, 1789). Representative Sherman, although noting this possibility,
"did not see an absolute necessity for a clause of this kind." Id. at 750.
175 See id. at 751.
176 See id. at 750.
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natural right immunity from the governmental prohibition of conduct that did
not affect others.
d. Summary
To summarize, then, those drafting and approving the religion clauses
wanted to prevent governmental incursions on the basis of religion. This meant
that the government could not interfere with individuals in the private sphere of
their religion unless their religion affected others. It also meant that individuals
could not use the religion clauses to justify invading the rights of others. With
respect to religion, the government was to leave the citizens in the pre-
government position except as their conduct affected others.
The religion clauses embody this understanding and therefore restrain the
government from doing things that its powers would otherwise permit it to do,
but do not allow it to exercise governmental power to alter the preexisting
situation with respect to religion. Moreover, the concept of harm to others does
not include psychic damage caused by blasphemy or conduct otherwise in
disregard of the rules of others' religions. Consequently, the power of the
government to prevent harm to others did not eliminate the rule that
government could not regulate merely self-regarding acts. This view of the
religion clauses avoids the conflict between the clauses. The Supreme Court's
early decisions carried these views into effect.
3. The Social Contract View and the Early Supreme Court Decisions
The widespread nature of the social contract view is further evidenced by
early judicial opinions, which seem to have held that the fundamental principles
of government prohibited the legislature from shifting property from one
person to another. In COlder v. Bull,177 Justice Chase suggested that a state
legislature could not, even if "not expressly restrained by the Constitution"178
adopt a law that "takes property from A. and gives it to B.," 179 because such a
law would exceed the proper power of government. Justice Story's opinion for
the Court in Terrett v. Taylor'80 struck down Virginia's attempt to divest the
Episcopal Church of its property because it would violate the "fundamental
laws of every free government." 181
177 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798).
178 Id. at 388.
179 Id.
180 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
181 Id. at 52.
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Early Court decisions saw these limitations as applying to both the creation
of rights and their infringement. "[The federal government] can neither grant
nor secure to its citizens any right or privilege not expressly or by implication
placed under its jurisdiction. " 182 Later opinions also hold that the Constitution
"does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are
purely and exclusively private, but it does authorize the establishment of laws
requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as
not unnecessarily to injure another." 183
These holdings support the social contract view, and they particularly
support the conclusion that the government could not promote religion or
transfer burdens on the basis of religion; if any transfer was prohibited,
certainly those based on individuals' exercise of their inalienable rights were
prohibited. The early Court decisions also specifically apply the social contract
view to the issues of the invasion of individual rights and governmental support
for religion.
a. The Invasion of Individual Rights by Governmental Regulation
The early Supreme Court decisions adopted the Framers' statements that
tested the permissibility of regulation by the difference between self- and other-
regarding conduct, not the difference between belief and action. Thus, in its
1878 decision in Reynolds v. United States,184 the Court followed Jefferson's
statement,
'that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its
officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and
good order.' In these two sentences is found the true distinction between what
properly belongs to the Church and what to the State. 1 8 5
182 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1875).
183 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876) (citing Thorpe v. Rutland & B.
R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 143 (1855)).
184 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
185 Id. at 163 (citing the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 12 VA.
STAT. 84 (Hening 1823)) (emphasis supplied). The Court then quoted Jefferson's famous
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, in which he stated that the Bill of Rights built "a
wall of separation between Church and State" and that a person "'has no natural right in
opposition to his social duties[.]'" The Court continued, "Coming as this does from an
acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured." Id. at 164
(quoting 8 WRrrINGS OFTHOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Henry A. Washington ed., 1861)).
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Had the Court intended to adopt Justice Scalia's distinction between belief
and action,186 the italicized portion would have been superfluous. Further
supporting this reading of the Reynolds decision is that the Court was at pains
to show that apparently self-regarding conduct-decisions about marriage--had
social consequences. 187
Other early decisions note that the religious clauses protected "practical
freedom for all forms of religious belief and practice," 188 not merely belief.
189
More recently, the Supreme Court observed that it has approved of regulation
infringing on religious interests when the conduct "invariably posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." 190
The pre-Smith decisions also reflect the social contract view's rejection of
the claim that psychic harm could justify government regulation. "[T]he state
has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views
distasteful to them .... It is not the business of government in our nation to
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine .... "191
Collective groups, too, could assert a right of autonomy. Thus, Justice
Story wrote in his Commentaries that religious groups were permissible so long
as they had no effect outside the groups, 192 and the Supreme Court recognized
the rights of citizens to form religious organizations with internal rules not to
be reviewed by the courts. 193 The idea that regulation could be based on
186 Se Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,879 (1990).
187 Reynod&, 98 U.S. at 164. The case is sometimes cited for the proposition that the
government could not legislate in matters of belief, but had a free hand to deal with
conduct. Actually, the Court concluded that "Congress... was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id. This is
inconsistent with the Smith decision that religious practice was unprotected.
188 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) (emphasis added). See also
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627-29 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J., joined
by Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, TL; Marshall, I., not sitting) (holding that regulation of
religion "in terms of conduct and activity rather than in terms of belief" was nonetheless
subject to "judicial scrutiny" and striking down the state prohibition under the Free Exercise
Clause).
189 Smith misinterpreted these decisions to say that they adopted a distinction between
belief and practice by quoting portions of the opinions out of context. See Smith, 494 U.S.
at 879.
190 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
191 Joseph Burtsyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952).
192 IOSEPH STORY, RuleS of Interpretation of the Constitution, in 3 COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONsTTTION OF THE UNTrED STATES § 454, at 440 (1858).
193 See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29. Cf. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 43, 48-49 (1815) (giving sects the right to have corporate form does not violate the
Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses); TRIBE, supra note 16, § 14-1 (describing religious
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conduct that did not affect others is difficult to reconcile with this prohibition
on the regulation of autonomous religious groups.
Finally, the decisions reject constitutional requests for exemptions from
conscription. 194 The risk of conscription was part of the social contract.
b. Governmental Promotion of Religion
The Court has accepted the idea that government compulsion to obtain
money for the propagation of opinions with which one disagrees may violate
the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. In Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,195 the Court applied the Free Speech Clause to prohibit a
union of government employees from using non-member's service fees for
subsidizing ideological activity to which the non-members objected. 196 In
Keller v. State Bar,197 the Court extended the principle to the state bar.198
In both cases, the Court relied on the objections of the Framers to
compulsory religious contributions.' 99 In both Abood and Keller the Court
cited Madison's Memorial and Jefferson's Virginia Bill for the proposition that
compulsory support "for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is
sinful and tyrannical." 200 Abood further quoted:
James Madison, the First Amendment's author, [who] wrote in defense of
religious liberty: 'Who does not see... [t]hat the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of
any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever?' 20 1
Abood also relies on the Court's prior religion clause cases. 202
rights as rights of "autonomy").
194 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (dictum).
195 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
196 Id. at 234 n.31.
197 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
198 Id. at 10.
199 See supra p. 26 and notes 134-35.200 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 n.31; Keller, 496 U.S. at 10 (quoting IRVING BRANT,
JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948) (quoting Virginia Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom, Preamble, 12 VA. STAT. 84 (Hening 1823), reprinted in 1 STOKES,
supra note 55, at 392)).
20 1 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 & n.31 (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, THE WRT INGs OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 19, at 186).
2 02 See id. at 235 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) and Cantwell v.
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Keller's and Abood's reliance on freedom of religion in a free speech case
means that the Court cannot logically reject the statements of Jefferson and
Madison in the area of religion, where they were intended to apply. The
Constitution's express prohibition of a religious "establishment" of an official
viewpoint provides much more justification for prohibiting government
religious speech than for prohibiting non religious speech. Abood's extension
of this prohibition to the non religious speech of private organizations that use
their positions as bargainers with the government to raise money for private
speech further supports the view that the government's use of money for
religious speech violates the rights of those compelled to contribute the
money.2o3
It is true that Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the Court's Keller opinion,
which relied on Madison's Memorial and Jefferson's Virginia Bill, has been
inconsistent on this point, arguing in dissent in Wallace v. Jaffiree that
Madison's Memorial and Jefferson's Virginia Bill were irrelevant in
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
Relying on cases like Abood does not presuppose that all governmental speech is
prohibited, merely that religious speech must be at least as prohibited as governmental
political speech, because the First Amendment provides a textual guarantee of religious
nonestablishment. See Michael McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986
BYU L. REv. 405, 448-49. Numerous cases have prohibited government agencies from
spending money to influence citizens on political issues, sometimes holding that structural
considerations prohibit such expenditures independently of guarantees of freedom of speech.
See, e.g., Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985) ("The principles of
representative government enshrined in our constitutions would limit government
intervention on behalf of its own candidates or against their opponents even if the First
Amendment and its state equivalents had never been adopted."). See also Stanson v. Mott,
551 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1976); Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So. 2d 529, 549 (Miss. 1992); Citizens to
Protect Public Funds v. Board of Educ., 98 A.2d 673, 677 (NJ. 1953) (Brennan, J.); Stern
v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447 (N.Y. 1975); Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal
Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARv. L. REy. 535 (1980). Cf. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (because governmental support for religion could
create a dominant religious view, threatening future religious intolerance, governmental
promotion of religion is worse than governmental promotion of non religious ideas).
203 The Court had earlier held that governmental agreements creating rights to money
in private persons did not make the use of that money for religious purposes a violation of
the Establishment Clause. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908) (permitting
the United States to appropriate Sioux funds that the United States held in trust for
educational purposes, even though the fund was created by annual appropriations and would
be used at a sectarian school).
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interpreting the religion clauses. 204 However, leaving aside his inconsistency,
his Wallace dissent is not well-reasoned.
In Wallace, he first claimed that Madison's rejection of the Bill of Rights
during the Virginia ratification debates showed that Madison did not want the
Virginia Bill's protections to be in the Constitution, making the Memorial and
Remonstrance and the Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
irrelevant to the interpretation of the religion clauses. 205 However, Madison's
work for religious freedom in Virginia shows that he believed states should be
prevented from interfering with religious freedom. As Madison observed in the
debates, the federal government should be bound by the same restrictions that
existed for the state governments. 20 6 Moreover, Madison's statements that the
Bill of Rights was unnecessary resulted from Madison's belief that the federal
government could not violate individual liberties because this was not among
its enumerated powers207 and his belief that the absence of a Bill of Rights
could best be corrected by amending the Constitution, not by refusing to ratify
it.208
Justice Rehnquist also claimed in his Wallace dissent that Madison's failure
to express his views in the debates makes his views irrelevant. 209 However,
Madison's public writings show what Madison and the public in Virginia, and
therefore the ratifiers, understood as an "establishment." 210 This information
204 Walace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205 See id.
206 See supra pp. 6-7 and notes 39-40.
207 See 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 438 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789)
("[i]n the Federal Government [a declaration of rights is] unnecessary, because the powers
are enumerated... and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum
was thrown into the hands of the government"). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra
note 97, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (the President "has no particle of spiritual
jurisdiction"); 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 442 (statement of Rep. Jackson, June 8, 1789)
("There is no power given to Congress to regulate this subject [the liberty of the press] as
they can commerce, or peace, or war."); id. at 730 (statement of Rep. Sherman, Aug. 15,
1789) ("The amendment [was] altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as Congress had no
authority whatever delegated to them by the Constitution to make religious
establishments."). C. The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 764 (1878) (Field, J.,
dissenting) ("The amendments prohibiting the exercise of any such power [a law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof] were adopted in the
language of the preamble accompanying them, when presented to the States, 'in order to
prevent misconception or abuse' of the powers of the Constitution.").
208 See 1 ANNALS, supra note 24, at 436 (statement of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789);
THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 35-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
209 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98-99.
2 10 See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 601-02 (1900) (citing the role of the ratifiers
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about how the public understood the meaning of words assists in interpreting
the amendments.
Although the Court has not expressly accepted the reasoning of Abood in
the religious cases, it apparently accepts the conclusion that governmental
support for religion can interfere with rights to communicate religious values.
Only such a conclusion explains why Amish parents, who believed that high
school would endanger their own and their children's salvation, had a right to
relief from a statute requiring parents to send their children to high school.211
The Court agreed with the Amish that "the modem high school is not
equipped... to impart the values promoted by Amish society" 212 and that the
state gave inadequate weight to "the values of parental direction of the religious
upbringing and education of their children." 213 This right to "impart values"
belongs to the parents, not the children: "[Olur holding today in no degree
depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the child . "...-214
The religious interest in preventing governmental support for competing
religious views also explains the Supreme Court's cases that have relied on
proselytization, not on financial support or coercion, to conclude that religious
rights have been infringed. In Marsh v. Chambers,215 which permitted opening
the legislative day with prayer, the Court was careful to note that "there is no
indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize." 216
Stone v. Graham217 prohibited posting the Ten Commandments in a school
in interpreting constitutional amendments).
211 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law criminalizing private schools). Where the harm to the
children is more serious, the courts more often allow the state to intervene. See Janet
Anderson, Capital Punishment of Kids: When Courts Permit Parents to Act on Their
Religious Beliefs at the Expense of Their Children's Lives, 46 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1993);
Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Patients,
Parents, and Healers, 16 U.P.S. L. REV. 599 (1993); Laura M. Plastine, Comment, "In
God We Trust": When Parents Refuse Medical Treatment for Their Children Based upon
Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123 (1993).
212 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212.
213 Id. at 213-14.
2 14 Id. at 230. The Court explicitly rejected the idea that similar protection could be
based on non religious grounds. See id. at 216. Smith claimed that these cases could be
distinguished because they involved both speech and religion. Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 881 n. 1 (1990) (characterizing Yoder as involving other constitutional
protections in addition to free exercise). Justice O'Connor's opinion sharply criticized this
statement. See id. at 895-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
215 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
216 Id. at 794.
217 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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room, even though private money paid for the posters and no student need look
at them. 218 Because the school did not use state money or coerce the students'
choice among religions, the objection must be that the governmental support
for one of a number of competing views about religion disadvantages those
with alternative beliefs. For like reasons, commentators speak of the
"prestige"-not the financial support or the interference with religious
practice-resulting from voluntary Bible readings in the public schools. 219
The principle that the government may not provide financial support to
religion is illustrated by the school aid cases. The early cases, like Everson v.
Board of Education,220 construed the Establishment Clause as meaning, "No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called ..... 221 The Court has
reasoned, "If Parliament had lacked the authority to tax unrepresented
colonists, then by the same token the newly independent States should be
powerless to tax their citizens for the support of a denomination to which they
did not belong." 222 Nor does "laundering" money by passing it through
government eliminate a claim that taking the money violates religious freedom.
"When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers
are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the donor means
that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious 'donors.'" 223
The Establishment Clause not only prohibits the government from
providing direct support for religion, it also prohibits using religion as a
ground for shifting benefits or burdens among citizens. Estate of Thornton v.
Coldor, Inc.224 invalidated a law giving employees the right not to work on
their Sabbath, because honoring the Sabbatarian's right would shift a
"significant" burden to employees with other religious beliefs. 225 "Other
employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-religious, reasons for
218 Id. at 42.
219 See William Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of Church and State: The
Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 865 (1963); see also Larldn v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982).
220 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
221 Id. at 16.
222 Larson v. Vallente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982).
223 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
224 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
225 Id. at 709-10. Although the Court's conclusion was expressly based on the
Establishment Clause, see id. at 710-11, the opinion it quoted at greatest length was decided
on the basis of free exercise. See id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205
F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J.)).
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wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the statute." 226 Similarly,
Larldn v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,227 invalidated a statute allowing churches to
veto applications for a liquor license that were too close to a church's
buildings, because the statute allowed the churches to "favor- liquor licenses
for members of that congregation or adherents of that faith." 228
This social contract view that individuals cannot use their religion as a
basis for making demands on the government has also influenced decisions
denying free exercise demands on the government for affirmative relief in the
management of government property or particular conduct in internal
government operations. "'[The Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of
what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the
individual can exact from the government." 229 Afortiori, the clause should not
allow individuals to make demands on other citizens, who have free exercise
rights of their own.
Finally, the Court has adhered to the Framers' conclusion that
governmental support for religion, whether financial or promotional,
jeopardizes religious diversity, which provides an important political guarantee
of freedom of religion. As the Court observed in Larson v. Vallente,23 0 in turn
relying on Madison's Federalist, in a free government the "'[s]ecurity for civil
rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in
the multiplicity of interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.'" 231
Thus, Madison continued, "The degree of security in both cases will depend on
the number of interests and sects .... 232 These views have been recognized
by the Court, albeit in a discussion of the Free Speech Clause.23 3 Eliminating
226 Id. at 710 n.9.
227 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
228 Id. at 125.
229 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)
(quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, I., concurring)). See
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (the First Amendment does not "require the
Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her
spiritual development.... The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens."); see also Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. Of course,
citizens' religious status does not interfere with their claims under ordinary laws. See Baxter
v. McDonnell, 49 N.E. 667, 671 (N.Y. 1898).
230 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
231 Id. at 245 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
232 THE FEDERALisT No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See
also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (fames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
233 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (because governmental support
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even non coercive support to religion reflects, as Larson observed, "Madison's
vision-freedom for all religion being guaranteed by free competition between
religions-[which] naturally assumed that every denomination would be equally
at liberty to exercise and propagate its beliefs. But such equality would be
impossible in an atmosphere of official denominational preference." 234 In
Zorach v. Clauson,235 the Court stated, "The government must be neutral
when it comes to competition between sects." 236 Without such neutrality, it
will be impossible for each sect to "flourish according to the zeal of its
adherents and the appeal of its dogma."237
Protection against coercion is insufficient to maintain a multiplicity of
sects, because it does not prevent people from being bribed or persuaded into
adopting a dominant religion.238 Thus, even when promotion does not interfere
for religion could create a dominant religious view, threatening future religious intolerance,
governmental promotion of religion is even worse than governmental promotion of non
religious ideas). In Justice Brennan's words, "The Framers did not entrust the liberty of
religious beliefs to either clause alone." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
256 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Cf. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE, supra note 15, at
325 (postulating that wealth must be distributed evenly so as to avoid skewing the political
process).
The government cannot indoctrinate on behalf of religion, but the government can
indoctrinate on behalf of non-religious values, so long as it does not compel a profession of
the government's values. Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (prohibiting
prayer in public schools even when children were excused because "the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform ... is plain") with West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requiring only that those who wished to abstain
from the flag salute be permitted to do so). In addition to the textual differences, the
difference in the treatment of religious speech and other speech may result from the greater
need for acceptance of political ideas. For religious ideas, as Madison's remarks suggest,
the interest of civil society is in creating a multiplicity of religions, none with a majority of
the population as its adherents, not in consensus. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 232,
at 324 (James Madison). By contrast, consensus in favor of a political system that provides
avenues for peaceful change is desirable to avoid the strife that would result from violent
disagreement about its legitimacy. See RAWLS, PoLrrIcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at
199-200; Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After
All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1991). No similar interest in consensus exists in favor of
particular office-holders, so partisan political speech and religious speech fall into one
category, and speech about democratic institutions falls into another.
23 4 Larson, 456 U.S. at 245.
235 334 U.S. 306 (1952).
23 6 Id. at314 (quoted in Larson, 456 U.S. at 246).
23 7 Id. at 313 (quoted in Larson, 456 U.S. at 246); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985).
238 Some have understood "the contribution of the Establishment Clause [to be] that
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with the subjective sense of freedom of a person choosing among religions,
preserving diversity requires that the government be prevented from bribery
and promotion, as well as from coercion. Governmental support jeopardizes
diversity because it can make the supported religion more attractive.23 9
Il. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT VIEW
The Supreme Court's treatment of the religion clauses needs to be revised
in three respects. First, the Court must recognize that government, at least the
federal government, cannot interfere with people's free exercise of religion
unless it shows that the free exercise harms others. This harm cannot be the
mere psychological harm that follows from knowing that other people are
acting or believing in a way inconsistent with one's own views about religion.
Thus, the social contract view provides an area of freedom within which
individuals can act. That area is the area where their conduct does not affect
others. Because no one else can complain that their rights have been infringed
by such liberty, the social contract view provides the maximum protection to
individual religious freedom that is possible without infringing on the rights of
religious belief and practice are insulated even from government persuasion." Douglas
Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Cause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 373 (1992).
The analysis in the text suggests that the same result follows from the Free Exercise Clause,
with appropriately broader protection to the rights of individuals.
239 It might be argued that religious propaganda will not affect diversity, because "any
danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced ... is a
danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment." First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978); accord Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49; Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1981) (striking down limits on
contributions to associations spending money in support of or against referenda). C.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) ("[I]nformation is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to
open the channels of communication rather than to close them.").
However, this argument assumes that religious persuasion is solely rational. Deductive
rationality cannot be primary when choosing among ends, and the Supreme Court has
deprecated the role of rationality in choosing among religious beliefs: "[R]eligious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit
First Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); accord
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). f. Lon Fuller, The Fonns and Limits
of Adjudicadon, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 381 (1978) (describing a realm of decision making
that is neither strictly deductive nor wholly empirical). Where a result cannot be reached by
deduction alone, the number of messages may be as influential as the reasoning they
express.
19961
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
individual religious freedom that is possible without infringing on the rights of
others.
Second, the Court should recognize that the Free Exercise Clause prevents
governmental promotion of religion, because that promotion harms those with
competing views about religion. Those who would like to use such resources
cannot complain, because they would not have had such resources before the
government was formed. The language of inalienable rights makes clear that
the government would not have been formed had it been known that the
government would be able to promote one particular set of views about
religion. This would reject the Court's "coercion" analysis, which is not used
for the Free Speech Clause, thereby eliminating an inconsistency in the
treatment of the two clauses.
Finally, the social contract view explains the proper way of dealing with
claims for "exemptions" and "accommodations." Under the social contract
view, the neutral position for the religion clauses is the state of affairs where no
rights are invaded on the basis of religion and where individuals can behave as
they like, so long as their conduct does not affect others.240 This neutral
position limits governmental regulation in the area of religion to acts that affect
others and prevents individuals from advancing claims against the government
on the grounds that not burdening their religion requires the government to
give them something they could not have had in the state of affairs existing
before the formation of the government.
The social contract view's general prohibition on self-regarding conduct
limits the need for exemptions, with their intrusive requirements of sincerity or
centrality. 241 Under the social contract view, where the government's demands
for services, such as conscription, creates differential burdens, the government
may, but need not, take steps to equalize the burdens. While the government
can lift the burdens it imposes, it cannot use its power to promote religion,
even on the theory that by doing so it is "accommodating" religion, because
that violates individuals' inherent rights. When the government takes money
from someone to support someone else's religion, it violates the religious rights
of the person from whom the money is taken. This conclusion is supported not
only by the social contract theory, but also by the Framers' express rejection of
a right to inculcate morality.242
240 This neutral position may not be the correct one for other constitutional guarantees.
See infra note 316.
241 Thus, the view of some commentators that Smith is defensible because it eliminates
the need for such scrutiny is based on the false assumption that only Smith's approach
prevents such scrutiny. See Wayne McCormack, Subsidies for Expression and the Future of
Free Exercise, 1993 BYU L. REv. 327.
242 See supra p. 30.
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Many will find these conclusions troublesome. However, many of these
objections have force not because the federal government is prohibited from
regulating or promoting religious conduct, but because the incorporation of the
religion clauses prohibits the states from regulating or promoting religious
conduct.243 This is especially true for the religion clauses' ban on the
regulation of self-regarding conduct, because of the formerly preeminent role of
state governments in "the ordinary administration of criminal and civil
justice." 244 The most appropriate way to confront such fears is not to distort
the meaning of the religion clauses, but to address the issue of incorporation
directly.245 To restrict the scope of First Amendment protections because of the
Fourteenth Amendment's extension of these protections to state action would
be an anachronism.
Despite the numerous advantages of the view of the Framers and that of the
early Supreme Court decisions, many of the implications of the social contract
view are at odds with the Supreme Court's views today. The next sections
discuss these in more detail.
243 Jefferson, after all, did not see any conceptual problem in a strictly limited federal
power over religion and fill state power over religion. In his Second Inaugural Address, he
stated:
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by the
constitution independent of the powers of the general government. I have therefore
undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the religious exercises suited to it; but have
left them, as the constitution found them, under the direction and discipline of Church
or State authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.
Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), reprinted in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRr1INGs OF THOMAS JEFFRON 341 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1944); see also Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845) ("The
Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their
religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition
imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states.").
2 44 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
245 See supra note 43. C. Gary Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the
Establishment Cause and Fourteenth Amendrnent: The Citizenship Declaration, 26 IND. L.
REV. 469 (1993) (focusing on the incorporation of the Establishment Clause and analyzing
non-coercive support for religion under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). But see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Cause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accomodation of Religion, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 555, 568 n.35
(1991).
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A. The Social Contract View and the Regulation of Private Conduct
Like Smith, the social contract view concludes that conduct directed against
religion is invalid. The chief difference between Smith and the social contract
view is that Smith provides no zone of protection for private conduct that does
not infringe on the rights of others. The social contract view thus provides
much broader protection.
Accepting the view of the Framers means overruling Smith, a case in
which none of the Justices who addressed the issue concluded that peyote
consumption affected the rights of others. 246 The Court may have ignored the
historical interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause because it objected to a
religious right to consume drugs, even if the consumption would not harm
others.2 47 As noted earlier, however, this seems to be based on an
anachronistic view of the First Amendment.2 48
The Framers' view avoids the parade of horribles that the Smith Court
provided as reasons why it could not protect religious conduct from
government regulation. The Framers' view would allow the government to
compel taxes or military service, prohibit manslaughter, control traffic, or
protect the environment, all of which the Smith Court provided as examples of
things it feared that a contrary holding would invalidate.249
A second major difference between the social contract view of the Framers
and the Smith view is that Smith allows universal legislative exemptions,
despite the possibility that these exemptions "will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in." 250 The
social contract view is narrower. Under it, exemptions are generally not
needed, because conduct is subject to regulation by the state only where it
harms others. Where it does harm others, exemptions are improper and
unconstitutional, because they allow people to assert religion as a basis for
invading the rights of others.
246 Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (concluding that peyote consumption was harmful to the person involved) dth
id. at 911-12 (Blackmun J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, IT.) (concluding
that state had not shown that "peyote has ever harmed anyone.").
247 See id. at 889 n.5.
248 See supra Part lI.B.2.
249 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889. Because conviction of a crime allows a restriction of
liberties, the social contract view would not alter the Court's current curtailment of the
religious liberties of prisoners. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); see
also Mary A. Schnabel, Comment, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Prison's
Dilemma, 29 WILLAmmEL. REv. 323 n.3 (1993).
250 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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The purely private rights model of religion applies with greatest force to
government action that transfers money or other benefits directly from some
citizens to others. There are two problems that the neutrality model does not
directly address. One is governmental demands for the money or services that
it needs to function. The second is private demands asking that the government
run its operations in a certain way.
In both of these cases, the correct rule is that exemptions are permitted, but
not required. The Framers recognized that government would require money
and services for its own support as part of the quid pro quo whereby one
obtained a government to defend one's rights. 251 These were recognized
departures from the ideal of a government that left intact private rights, so the
social contract view provides no right to an exemption from these demands.
However, the social contract view of neutrality allows the legislature to create
exemptions from these rules in an attempt to restore an approximation of the
status quo. 252 For example, conscription into the armed forces would unequally
burden those whose religious beliefs prohibit military service, but an exemption
from conscription for those whose religious beliefs prohibit military service
would harm others. In such a case, there is no original, neutral position, only a
choice between alternatives that are more or less non neutral. 25 3 In choosing
among those alternatives, the legislature can properly consider freedom of
religion, but can also consider the wisdom in drafting those who would refuse
to fight, the resentment of those conscripted because of conscientious objection,
the unfairness of allowing religions exempt from generally applicable rules to
attract new adherents, 25 4 and the alternative service available for those seeking
recognition for their conscientious objection. The selective service cases
generally, but appropriately, defer to legislative judgment. 25 5 In the case of
251 See supra note 26. For the Framers' view as to taxation, see THE FEDERALIST No.
34, supra note 167, at 210 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Mhe exigencies of the Union [for
taxation] could be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination."), and for their view as to
conscription, see THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 167, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton)
(suggesting that one of the main purposes of the new federal Constitution was to enable the
easier levying of troops).
252 One supporter of neutrality concludes that exemptions are unjustified, but without
discussing the possibility that exemptions might promote equality. See KURLAND, supra note
42, at 114.
253 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion)
("[When [the] government directs a subsidy... that... cannot reasonably be seen as
removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion.., it
'provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations' and cannot but
'convey] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the community.").
254 For Madison's objections to exemptions, see supra note 132.
255 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971). Should the legislature
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conscription, this is reinforced by the debates in the House of
Representatives. 25 6 However, the removal of state-imposed burdens cannot be
an excuse for providing religious groups a position more favorable than that
they would have obtained in the original position.257
Other religiously motivated objections to work cause similar problems. The
problem comes as much from the compelling of employment taxes in which the
religious person may have a smaller return (if her claim is not honored) as it
does from the rules governing unemployment compensation. 258 Sherbert v.
VerneF259 may be defended on its facts, because those who had Sunday as their
holy day were treated better than those whose holy day was Saturday. 260 Such
legislative discrimination among religions is difficult to justify. However,
Thomas v. Review Board261 and Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Commission
of Florida262 are difficult to defend, because they mandate a special status for
religious preferences. The correct treatment would have been to follow the
precedent of the conscription cases.
The second problem, private demands on governmental resources, has
arisen in two contexts. One is demands on governmental resources on internal
government operations. As the social contract view would require, the Court
has rejected such demands on resources263 or any requests that the government
attempt invidious discrimination among religions, the Equal Protection Clause or the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause would provide protection. See Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny for discrimination among
religions); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (stating that the federal government
must satisfy equal protection requirements as part of due process).
256 See supra pp. 34-35.
257 C. supra note 244.
258 See RICHARD A. EPsTaN, BARGAINING WnTH THE STATE 254-65 (1993).
259 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
260 See id. at 410.
261 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Some may argue that the issue is not a matter of tastes, but
of accommodating religious prohibitions. However, the distinction between the two may be
difficult to make. For example, that Muslim families in Malaysia have lower incomes than
ethnic Chinese families results from Islamic women's seldom working outside the home.
See John Muellbauer, Professor Sen on the Standard of Living, in THE STANDARD OF LIVING
39, 45 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 1987). The lower income can be seen as resulting from a
religious prohibition, a difference in tastes, or from discrimination against women
emanating from men. See id.
262 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
263 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
451 (1988). Such cases also pose difficulties for the thesis that accommodation, in the
context of "government action [that] threatens to interfere with the exercise of
religion... consists of exemption." Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion.:
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run its operations in certain ways. 264
The other context is the creation of government entities in ways that
coincide with the interests of religious groups. Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel v. Grnet265 presents a parallel problem of constituting the government.
The social contract view suggests that separate groupings are permissible, but
not required. 266 With respect to the structure of government, the
pregovernment state does not provide a neutral position. The Court's
resolution, as subsequent writers have recognized, focused on an equal-
protection-like test,267 akin to that which the Court subsequently adopted for
racially motivated political boundaries. 268
B. The Social Contract View and the Governmental Promotion of
Religion
The Framers' social contract beliefs provided that government could not
promote religion because this promotion conferred on its beneficiaries rights
that they would not have had in the pregovernment state. They explained the
desirability of prohibiting governmental promotion of religion by reference to
the harm suffered by those compelled to provide support for the promotion.
The Framers were concerned with prohibiting governmental religious
conduct, and they did not have recondite views of standing and harm. What the
Framers absolutely prohibited, the Supreme Court tends to consider as two
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685, 686 (1992). In
cases like Lyng, where the citizen seeks to avert threatened destruction of the characteristics
of the property that make it religiously valuable, the governmental conduct that the citizen
seeks will alter the condition of the property for all citizens, even though only some citizens
view that alteration as religiously significant.
264 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
265 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
266 Of course, such a view would not allow a created entity to violate the
Establishment Clause. See Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiiyas Joel, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 104, 111-12 (1996) [hereinafter Uncovering the Village]. In addition, the Supreme
Court's analysis of racial segregation in districting would apply equally well to religion. See
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (prohibiting drawing of districts primarily on
racial lines); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (same); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny for discrimination among religions); Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (stating that the federal government must satisfy equal protection
requirements as part of due process).
2 67 See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 CoLUM.
L. REy. 1, 58-59 (1996).
268 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2494; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649.
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separate issues. First, the Court asks whether there is harm suffered by the
government's promotion of religion. Then, the Court asks whether the
government can rightfully inflict that harm, as an "accommodation" of
religious interests.
1. The Harm fom the Government's Promotion of Religion
The social contract view recognizes that governmental promotion of
religion interferes with individual rights. The Supreme Court's decisions
disregarding promotional effects create inconsistencies between the First
Amendment's religion clauses and its Free Speech and Press Clauses. The Free
Speech Clause protects individuals against the taking of their money to support
alternative views.269 A failure to recognize rights against the government's
promotion of religion gives religious speech less protection than ordinary
speech. 270 Recognition that governmental support for religion interferes with
the religious rights of those compelled to provide support and those
disadvantaged by the government's support for hostile views will remove this
inconsistency and provide several other advantages.
First, recognizing this interference means that these are free exercise
rights, just as parallel claims against compulsory government non religious
speech are free speech claims.271 This reduces the importance of the correct
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the question of its incorporation.
Even if the Establishment Clause were intended to protect state
establishments, 272 the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that
the government cannot use its power to support its views about religion.
Second, express recognition that support for one religion interferes with
the rights of those with competing views would eliminate the confusion
between financial and promotional support. Thus, the Court's reliance in Lynch
v. Donnelley273 on the minimal value of the creche addresses a claim that the
government is providing financial aid to religion, but ignores the government's
promotion of an opposing set of religious views, which the Court had
previously found to be unconstitutional, even when no public money was
269 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 10 (1990) (holding that unified bar
members cannot be compelled to support the union's political positions); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 & n.31 (1977); see also supra note 202.
270 Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976) (allowing standing to
challenge governmental expenditures under the Free Speech Clause) widt Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (free exercise claim requires showing coercion).
271 See supra Part I.A.4 ("Governmental Promotion of Religion").
272 See supra note 245. But see supra Part ILA.2 and note 43.
273 465 U.S. 668, 681-82 (1984).
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involved.274 This considers only the financial effects of aid and disregards
both the symbolic value of governmental support and the substantial secular
purpose of educating children at both religious and secular private schools,
which had no equivalent in Lynch. Both financial and promotional support
violate the rights of those from whom money is taken or to whom support is
not given, but comparing a case involving financial aid with one of promotion
would also disregard the substantial secular purpose of educating children at
both religious and secular private schools.
Third, recognizing symbolic endorsement would demonstrate the
difficulties of the unequal use of governmental facilities, even if no financial
expense could be identified. The choice of government, rather than
commercially available facilities, 275  suggests that those seeking the
governmental property desire the symbolic endorsement. 276 If those seeking to
use governmental facilities argue that merchants refuse to rent property for fear
of public reaction to their apparent endorsement of religion, this itself
demonstrates the harm caused by governmental endorsement. However, even if
religious groups seek no symbolic endorsement, but merely seek to save money
by using free governmental property instead of market-rate private property,
the religious use of nonpublic fora creates hostility among groups competing
for the use of those fora,277 and the competition reduces the benefit of the
2 74 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (imvalidating the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public schools, even though the posting was funded by private money).
275 A different rule might apply where private places were unavailable. Cy Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("On the
other hand, hostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and
places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian
opportunities for public communion....").
276 Thus, Professor Laycock observes,
I ask why it is so important that the city put up the creche instead of the association of
churches. Why must there be prayer at graduation, with a captive audience of children,
instead of at a privately sponsored baccalaureate with an audience of volunteers? I think
it is precisely because some people want a symbolic affirmation that government
approves and endorses their religion, and because many of the people who want this
affirmation place little or no value on the costs to religious minorities.
Douglas Laycock, Suwnmary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 844, 846 (1992).
277 See, e.g., Colbert I. King, Life Is Stronger, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1996, at A17
(describing the San Diego Atheist Coalition's obtaining a permit to use a park for Easter
Sunday as "an act of vindictiveness that lends new meaning to the word 'spite'"). In
Rosenberger v. Rector, the Court apparently rejected the idea that government could pick
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apparently free use of governmental property. 278
Fourth, recognition that governmental support interferes with the
promulgation of competing views would reverse the result in Valley Forge
OWistian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 279 which upheld a gift of surplus governmental property to a group
training people for the ministry. 280 The opinion assumes that not donating
money to the government is the sole interest individuals have in preventing the
support of religion. Because the gift of governmental property was made from
government surplus stocks, not from funds created by annual appropriations,
the Court believed the individuals did not have standing.281 Recognizing that
governmental support for religion harms those with competing views would
and choose among speakers in crowded public fora, saying that "[lilt would have been
incumbent on the State, of course, to ration or allocate the scarce resources on some
acceptable neutral principle." 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2519 (1995). This suggests that the Court is
willing to allow competing religious views to object to the selection process, which implies
that a recognition of their interest in preventing partisan governmental support. In addition,
the Court observed that it was not faced with an objection from a student to the use of
money for religious purposes. See id. at 2522.
278 "Anguish, hardship and bitter strife" result "when zealous religious groups
struggl[e] with one another to obtain the Government's stamp of approval." Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962). This conflict results from rent seeking, "[tihe tendency of an
expected gain to be translated into costs through competitive efforts." RicHARD POSNER,
ECONOMICANALYSiS OFLAW 37 n.3 (4th ed. 1992).
279 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
280 See id. at 490. Valley Forge, by allowing the government to donate surplus
buildings for immediate religious use, conflicts with prior cases that had prohibited federal
aid to sectarian colleges to the extent that the aid could be used to construct a building that,
twenty years after the grant could be "used for sectarian instruction or religious worship."
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971).
281 The plaintiffs in Valley Forge sought to establish a right to oppose the sale based on
their status as taxpayers and as citizens, but "fail[ed] to identify any personal injury suffered
by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error." 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis in
original). Thus, the Court has not expressly held that one's rights are not infringed by the
promotion of alternative religious views, but only has noted that the plaintiff had not alleged
such an infringement. See id. at 472; accord Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 34, 753 F.2d
1528, 1531-32 (9th Cir. 1985) (the parents of children have standing under both the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to challenge the school's use of a book hostile to
their religious beliefs, but a mere taxpayer does not). But see Harris v. City of Zion, 927
F.2d 1401, 1420 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (construing Valley Forge as
holding that offense does not create standing). In any case, a doctrine that those damaged by
the government's promulgation of competing beliefs have standing may obviate the need for
exceptions from the general rule that taxpayers do not have standing. See last v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
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have conferred standing on the plaintiffs, because the government's support of
the Christian College diminished their ability to persuade others to adhere to
opposing tenets.
Finally, showing that the governmental promotion of religious views
interferes with individual rights provides a stronger reason for limiting
governmental promotion than the mere fear that governmental promotion will
lead to a future invasion of rights. As Madison observed, "[I]ndirect and
remote considerations... will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which
one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the
whole." 2s2
2. The Social Contract View and the Neutral Position
The Framers recognized, as the Court often refuses to recognize, that
governmental support for religion interferes with the rights of others, either
because they are compelled to provide the support or because they are
disadvantaged in the marketplace of religious ideas. The Court could decide
that it had erred in declining to recognize that support for religion caused harm,
but nonetheless uphold its decisions on the merits on the grounds that the
legislature could balance the desires of recipients against the harm done to
those hurt by the support. The claim of the majority in Rosenberger rests in
part on the theory that such balancing is permitted by the Constitution.28 3
The Framers rejected this accommodation. The social contract view
explains why. Under their view, the pregovemmental state provided the neutral
position. With the pregovernmental state as the neutral position, government
cannot transfer resources from one religious group to another, even if those
running the government think that the recipients need it more. This analysis
also explains why the Framers found no conflict between the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause. The conflict between the clauses exists
282 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 232, at 80 (James Madison).
283 See Rosenberger v. Rector, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 (1995) (denying that support for
a religious publication "was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a
pervasive bias or hostility to religion"); see also, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 657 (Kennedy, I., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[r]he
Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating
the central role religion plays in our society.... Any approach less sensitive to our heritage
would border on latent hostility toward religion .... ") (citation omitted). To sustain his
desired result in the case, in which a particular religious viewpoint received special
treatment, Justice Kennedy defended, as he had to, the proposition that "government speech
about religion is [not] per se suspect." Id. at 661. See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public
Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REv. 671 (1992).
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only if people are entitled to have the government help them practice their
religion.
For this reason, the claim that not acknowledging the role of religion
would send a "clear message of disapproval" of religion,28 4 is simply
incorrect. By refusing to take money from some people to support the religious
views of others or to become a partisan in religious debate, the government
honors the religious rights of those who object to having the government used
to promote other views. 285 In public fora, where official preference is not an
issue, equality of speech is available to all. 286 Thus, the purportedly less
favorable treatment for religious claims to governmental benefits or
promotional assistance results from the favored status of religion. When the
government transfers money from one group to another or uses its facilities,
paid for by all, to spread one group's message rather than another's, both the
favored and disfavored groups have religious claims. 287 Because the
government cannot prefer some religious interests to others, there is no
justification for the government's altering the status quo.288
The Supreme Court's departure from the Framers' status quo view of
2 84 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, I., dissenting).
285 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-60. Citing the constitutional protection accorded
religion would not have been an adequate explanation. The government has no duty to
subsidize constitutionally protected activities. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(government may prohibit expenditure of funds for abortion counseling, although giving
funds for counseling of other views); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977) (permitting
government to subsidize childbirth, even when it refuses to fund abortion). For this reason,
the majority's argument in Rosenberger based on the need to avoid discriminatory
regulation of private speech is irrelevant. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
286 Where a public forum is involved, the freedoms of "speech and association
protected by the First Amendment" require granting equal access to religious speech.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981). The case did not involve "judgments as to
how best to allocate scarce resources." Id. at 276. Rental at market rates would avoid the
problem by using price to ration access. See Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch.
Admin. Dist. No. 5, 941 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1991).
287 Although only money is transferred to the government, the transferor can object on
free speech grounds. See supra pp. 24-27 and notes 177-203; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290 (1981). Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("Vhen the
Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact
of the exemption or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be
indirect and vicarious 'donors.'").
28 8 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153-55 (1974) (discussing
the historical basis for determining the just distribution of entitlements).
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neutrality in favor of a balancing approach removes the possibility of a
principled resolution of the conflict between those who want the help and those
who are disadvantaged because of it.28 9 Under this view, the legislature would
have discretion to recognize this claim, so long as it could characterize that
claim as a claim for neutrality. 290
The great trust that this approach places in the legislature is inconsistent
with the countermajoritarian purpose of the Bill of Rights. Under this
approach, the legislature could recognize virtually any claim a religious group
advances, so long as the legislature's motive is to equalize burdens instead of
promoting a particular religion or penalizing dissenters. 291 The judiciary cannot
effectively review these legislative decisions, because they require balancing the
centrality of parts of a religion against majoritarian needs, an inquiry not
appropriate for the judicial branch.292 Nor can one trust the political process to
ensure that these exemptions demonstrate only the tolerance of the majority for
the minority.293 Overturning Lemon v. Kunvan's294 requirement that the
government act with a neutral purpose would only exacerbate this problem,
289 Compare Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 612-13 (1989) (limitations on government
support for religion demonstrate the Constitution's respect for religion) with id. at 657
(Kennedy, I., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) ("ITihe Establishment
Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central
role religion plays in our society.... Any approach less sensitive to our heritage would
border on latent hostility toward religion .... .") (citation omitted).
290 This view led the dissenters in Allegheny to accuse the majority of hostility toward
religion because the majority refused to allow the legislature to grant religious groups'
demands for support priority over others' rights not to support. Id. at 657-58 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
291 See Uncovering the Village, supra note 266, at 118-19.
292 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-89 & nn.4-5 (1990). Much of
the argument consisted of criticism of the courts' ability to draw lines between central and
peripheral matters so as to allow balancing. See id. at 886-87. The rest of the argument
criticized an effects-based test as impractical. See id. at 887-89 & nn.4-5.
The practical difficulty of relying on absolute principles of intent or effect in resolving
free exercise claims leads some to adopt other concepts for determining burden. Professor
Lupu advocates using common law concepts to determine whether governmental activity
constitutes a burden. See Ira Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989). However, this approach
functions only where the government imposes a burden. If, as this Article argues,
individuals' rights are violated by the government's promotion of competing views, a
common law concept of burden no longer provides a useful tool for measuring impingement
on freedom of religion. Moreover, the concept of a common law approach is itself open to
criticism. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 4.
293 See Uncovering the Village, supra note 266, at 118-19.
294 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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because the purpose test provides a way to police legislative action intended to
favor a particular religion without relying on the disproportionate effect of the
action. 295
Where the judiciary does wish to police legislative action, the
unmanageable distinctions this view creates will generate formidable line-
drawing problems. 296  Even Justice Kennedy acknowledges that the
Establishment Clause "forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a
large Latin cross on the roof of city hall." 297 The dividing line, in this view, is
that too much persuasion becomes equivalent to "coercion." 298 However, the
proper line of separation between permitted and excess persuasion even divided
Justice Kennedy from those who joined in his Allegheny opinion which allowed
governmental promotion of religion.299
Two reasons seem responsible for this departure from the original
understanding. First, some Justices may have justified their departure from the
Framers' approach by the belief that governmental promotion of religion really
aids religion. However, history undermines any basis for such a belief. Barring
the government from supporting religion means that various sects need no
longer fear one another's control of the government, and the government's
blunders will no longer discredit religion.3° Although the United States has no
governmental support for religion, it also has more support for and adherence
to religion than almost any other country, including many countries with
substantial establishments. 301
295 Recent Supreme Court cases have avoided the Lemon test. See Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). Justice Scalia and others have advocated
abandoning Lemon, and Justice Scalia counted six sitting Justices who had written or joined
opinions condemning Lemon in Lamb's Capel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
29 6 See American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
297 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
298 Id. at 662.
299 Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (authored by Justice Kennedy,
who wrote the Allegheny dissent in which Justice Scalia joined) ith id. at 641 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the majority's definition of coercion as an "ersatz, 'peer-pressure'
psycho-coercion").300 See supra pp. 19-20 and notes 143-146.
301 See JAMES CASTELLI & GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN
FAITH IN THE 90's 33, 45, 47, 48 (1989) (U.S. is more religious than any country except
Malta); GEORGE GALLUP, GALLUP REPORT No. 236 (1985); GARY WILLS, UNDER GOD:
RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLmCS 15, 16 (1990).
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Second, the Court may have been affected by the challenge to natural law
and social contract views posed by the increasing popularity of utilitarianism.
"[]n the 1870s, natural rights and utilitarian justifications were approaching a
head-on collision in the legal system." 3°2 "[T]he earlier natural rights
justifications for the judicial function began to be overwhelmed by the overtly
instrumental use of private law to advance utilitarian objectives." 30 3 This
growth of utilitarianist influence also affected constitutional law interpretations:
if the purpose of the government was the greatest good for the greatest number,
then the legislature should be allowed to promote religion or accommodate
it.304
However, this departure from the Framers' intent is in an area where the
justifications for a utilitarian approach are strikingly weak. Most obviously,
utilitarianism is likely to be substantially less protective of individual rights
than a social contract view.30 5 The more profound difficulty with the Court's
adoption of a utilitarian perspective lies within the area of transfers on the basis
of claims of need; even those who usually criticize status quo neutrality find it
attractive, because of the potentially limitless and divisive claims that can
otherwise be made.3°6
Any transfer based on the more extravagant taste of the recipients will be
objectionable. The objections come from the difficulty of measuring claims for
need and the undesirability of encouraging people to cultivate expensive tastes.
Thus, someone whose expensive upbringing led to strong desires for pre-
phylloxera wine and plover's eggs has no moral claims on us.307
302 MORTON j. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRIsIS OF LEGAL ORTHoDoxY 112 (1992).
303 Id.; see also id. at36.
304 See Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, Constitution: On Recovering Our
Founding Prindples, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 507, 520 (1993); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. Rnv. 305, 336
(1993) (discussing influence of utilitarianism on Holmes and other American legal thinkers).
3 05 See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15. Utilitarianism will not justify an
equal liberty for all, because that also presupposes
'a certain similarity among individuals, say their equal capacity for the activities and
interests of men as progressive beings, and in addition a principle of the diminishing
marginal value of basic rights when assigned to individuals. In the absence of these
presumptions the advancement of human ends may be compatible with some persons'
being oppressed, or at least granted but a restrictive liberty.
Id. at 210-11.
306 See infra n.316.
307 See Kenneth I. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of
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The objection becomes even more forceful when the extravagant tastes are
religious preferences. In addition to the problems of any transfer, religious
transfers will favor some religious groups at the expense of others.308 People
Justice, 70 1. PHIL. 245, 253-54 (1973); see also Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism,
Distnbutive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
158, 185-94 (1990) (discussing the problem of expensive preferences). But see BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 59 (1980) (people with genetic
disadvantages or handicaps are entitled to extra resources to compensate for impediments
that they face through no fault of their own); NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, ch. 1-
3 (1985) (discussing compensatory health care); Amartya Sen, Justice: Means Versus
Freedoms, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 111, 120 (1990) (discussing individuals' disparate
"power... to convert primary goods into the achievement of ends").
308 Rawls describes this as a "receipt for religious controversy if not civil strife."
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 329-30. However, the problem of
selection of different ends remains largely ignored. Even Amartya Sen, who generally
criticizes Rawls's notion of primary goods for ignoring differences between individuals,
focuses on individuals' "power... to convert primary goods into the achievement of
ends," not on the discrepancies resulting individuals' selection of differing ends. Amartya
Sen, supra note 307, at 120.
Rawls accepts Sen's and Arrow's argument that variations in needs for medical care
and basic capabilities need to be addressed. See RAWLs, POLITICAL LBERALISM, supra note
15, at 183-84. However, his basis for distinguishing these from other impediments to
achieving one's ends is unclear. He in part justifies his claim that those with expensive
religious preferences should not have those claims satisfied at the expense of those with
modest preferences by arguing that "variations in preferences and tastes are seen as our own
responsibility," id. at 185, so that citizens must "have adjusted their likes and dislikes,
whatever they are, over the course of their lives to the income and wealth and station in life
they could reasonably expect." Id. at 186. See also id. at 329-30 (rejecting a claim for extra
resources for those with expensive religions, because of the resentment it would cause).
Rawls's view that individuals must adjust their religious preferences "to the income and
wealth and station in life they could reasonably expect" seems at odds with his statements
elsewhere:
[Religious, philosophical, or moral views] are understood to be forms of belief and
conduct the protection of which we cannot properly abandon or be persuaded to
jeopardize .... To be sure, there are religious conversions, . . . [blut presumptively
these conversions and changes are not prompted by reasons of power and position, or
of wealth and status, but are the result of conviction, reason, and reflection.
Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added). If Rawls is suggesting that those whose religious claims are
consistent with middle-class or lower levels of wealth are entitled to redistribution, but not
those with claims consistent only with higher levels, this would seem to be almost as
divisive as the approach he rejects. The approach suggested in the text provides a way of
rejecting such claims without the use of a comprehensive doctrine, albeit in the context of a
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may have a religious objection to contributing money to others for the exercise
of their religion.3°9 In this case, with religious rights on both sides, a
redistribution for religious purposes does not advance religion.310 Attempting
to scrutinize religious needs and religious objections would be even more
intrusive than scrutinizing objections to transfers based on secular preferences
and would still discriminate among people on the basis of their views about
religion.
Although the Framers did not discuss the issue, probably because the role
of the federal government was limited then, the social contract view's
prohibition of governmental promotion of religion does not prohibit transfers of
governmental funds for general purposes that private individuals spend on
religion. Because the pregovernment position is the neutral position, the courts
should examine one departure from the neutral position-the aid program-
only in connection with the second departure, the taxes that fund it.3 11 This
perspective increases the likelihood that general programs will be sustained,
because precluding recipients of aid from spending their money on religious
purposes could seriously reduce individuals' religious expenditures. 312
political structure that depends, unlike Rawls's, on a historical approach to the social
contract. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 197-99
(1980), reprinted in RONALD DwoRKmN, A MATTER OP PRINCIPLE 237, 242 (1985).
309 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 138 (unreasonable to use the
public's political powers to enforce a particular religious doctrine). Professor Rawls says
that denying a claim of this sort requires affirming a comprehensive view. See id. at 152-
53. This is something he believes that government ordinarily should avoid. See id. at 152.
("[B]y avoiding comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion and philosophy's
profoundest controversies so as to have some hope of uncovering a basis of a stable
overlapping consensus.").
310 Cf RAWLS, PoLMCAL LMERALISM, supra note 15, at 341 (describing claims for
assistance in exercising the basic liberties, such as the equal rights of conscience, as "self-
limiting").
3 11 See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING wrrH THE STATE 46-47 (1993); Douglas
Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuL
L. REv. 993, 996-97 (1990) (criticizing as disaggregated neutrality the Court's practice of
examining only one part of the governmental activities at issue). But cf Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973) ("To identify 'primary effect,' we narrow our focus from the
statute as a whole to the only transaction presently before us.").
3 12 See Donald Gianella, Lemon and 71lton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State
Entanglement, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 147, 191 (explaining that high taxes depriving
individuals of the right to spend money on religious purposes might require relief for
parochial schools to maintain neutrality); William Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of
Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL. SC. REv. 865, 871-72
n.25, 880 (1963) (explaining Zorach's approval of a released-time program for
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Moreover, when an individual does spend such redistributed money on
religion, the spending of money on religion results from both the governmental
program and the individual decision. People are unlikely to perceive the
governmental programs to be the cause of the religious expenditure, any more
than they would consider a governmental decision to hire people to be the
cause of the employees' religious expenditures. 313 This is especially true where
the public can identify something that the government receives in return for the
money that may ultimately be devoted to religious purposes.314
IV. CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, it would be possible to satisfy both claims for equal
treatment and claims that individuals not have the government take their money
for religious purposes. As Justice O'Connor observed in Rosenberger, "Not to
finance Wide Awake, according to petitioners, violates the principle of
neutrality by sending a message of hostility toward religion. To finance Wide
schoolchildren as a measure to prevent the state's secular demands on children's time from
eliminating religious activities, and noting the possibility of a similar effect with taxes). Cf.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating high school attendance requirements
for Amish children because it would destroy the Amish religion); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 324 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (discussing the problem of public programs
eliminating time for religion); RAWLS, POLrICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 194, 199-
200 (discussing the limits of permissible mandatory education for children against a claim
that this will interfere with the practices of religious sects that "wish to withdraw from the
modern world.").
313 It is incorrect "to view any aid ultimately flowing to the [religious school] as
resulting from a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion." Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986); accord Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Cf. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOREi,
CAUSATION IN THE LAw 63(2d ed. 1985) (explaining that causation "involves an implicit
judgment on such imprecise issues as the normal condition of the thing concerned and the
abnormality of what is identified as the cause"). The Supreme Court's observation in Witters
that no other person had chosen to finance a religious education with the state aid at issue
demonstrates the importance of unusualness. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
314 See id., at 486-87; see also Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781 n.37 (1973); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908)
(holding that the United States could appropriate Sioux funds that the United States held in
trust for educational purposes, even though the fund was created by annual appropriations
and would be used at a Sectarian School). C. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)
("To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to
penalize them for such speech.").
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Awake, argues the University, violates the prohibition on direct state funding
of religious activities." 315
This is not a perfect world. It is impossible to satisfy both claims.
However, the Framers' approach, which was well understood by their
contemporaries ratifying the Constitution and Bill of Rights, provides a
principled and historically sound resolution to the conflict.3 16 Under that
approach, the right of the transferor from whom money and the power to
confer intangible support are taken outweighs the claim of the transferee. Any
other approach creates conflicts to which there is no principled resolution and
promotes a continuing battle for control of the state's power to promote and
support religious views.
315 Rosenberger v. Rector, 115 S. Ct. at 2510, 2525 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
3 16 Because the status quo analysis applies to the religion clauses for historical reasons,
it may not apply to other clauses. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause puts an affirmative
duty on the government to exclude the effects of private racial prejudice. See Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). "Tlhe equal protection clause is most easily read as a
self-conscious rejection of status quo neutrality." SuNsTEN, supra note 74, at 154. Thus,
the Equal Protection Clause may contemplate a governmental commitment to equality that
permits governmental conduct intended to equalize the status of its citizens with respect to
religion. Qf Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)
(permitting the government to lift from religious organizations the burden of statutes
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, I., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (accepting
requirement of reasonable accommodation as having a valid secular purpose and effect).
Others have found prohibitions of religious discrimination justifiable philosophically, albeit
in a context without an historically based neutral position. See RAWLS, POLIICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 195.
19961 1325

